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MUSKRAT TEXTUALISM
Matthew L.M. Fletcher
ABSTRACT—The Supreme Court decision McGirt v. Oklahoma, confirming
the boundaries of the Creek Reservation in Oklahoma, was a truly rare case
in which the Court turned back arguments by federal and state governments
in favor of American Indian and tribal interests. For more than a century,
Oklahomans had assumed that the reservation had been terminated and acted
accordingly. But only Congress can terminate an Indian reservation, and it
simply had never done so in the case of the Creek Reservation. Both the
majority and dissenting opinions attempted to claim the mantle of textualism,
but their respective analyses led to polar opposite outcomes.
Until McGirt, a “faint-hearted” form of textualism had dominated the
Court’s federal Indian law jurisprudence. This methodology enables the
Court to seek outcomes consistent with the Justices’ views on how Indian
law “ought to be.” This Article labels this thinking Canary Textualism,
named after the dominant metaphor used for decades to describe Indian law,
the miner’s canary—a caged bird used to warn of toxic gases in a mine.
Canary textualists treat Indians and tribes as powerless and passive subjects
of federal law and policy dictated by Congress and the Supreme Court.
Canary Textualism relies on confusion in the doctrinal landscape and fear of
tribal powers to justify departures from settled law. The 1978 decision
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, in which the Supreme Court stripped
Indian tribes of critical law enforcement powers by judicial fiat, is the
prototypical Canary Textualism case. Oliphant’s hallmark is the Court’s
legal acknowledgment that Indian tribes are dependent on the federal
government in light of centuries of precedents that presumed the racial
inferiority of Indian people. This allowed the Court to quietly assume that
tribal governments are inferior as well.
Scholars long have decried the Court’s Canary Textualism but have
rarely offered a better theory. This Article attempts to fill that gap and to
provide more certainty in federal Indian law textualist doctrine that will help
preclude Canary textualist activism. A far better metaphor than the miner’s
canary is that of the muskrat—the hero of the Anishinaabe origin story of the
great flood, a lowly, humble animal that nevertheless took courageous and
thoughtful action to save creation. Indians and tribes are no longer caged
birds. Tribal governments are active participants in reservation governance.
They are innovative and forward-thinking. Luckily, the McGirt decision
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exemplifies a new form of textualism, Muskrat Textualism, that
acknowledges and respects tribal actions and advancement. Muskrat
textualists accept tribal governments as full partners in the American polity.
Muskrat textualists accept the relevant interpretative rules that govern
federal Indian law where texts are ambiguous and where texts are absent or
not controlling. As a result, Muskrat Textualism is also a superior form of
textualism more generally, illustrating the proper role of the judiciary in
constitutional law and statutory interpretation and ensuring more predictable
and just Indian law adjudication.
This Article argues that McGirt—and its embrace of Muskrat
Textualism—is a sea change in federal Indian law, and rightfully so. If that
is the case, then cases like Oliphant should be reconsidered and tossed into
the dustbin of history.
AUTHOR—MSU Foundation Professor of Law, Michigan State University
College of Law. Miigwetch to Eric Biber, Kristen Carpenter, Seth Davis,
Sonia Katyal, Jessica Litman, Leah Litman, Monte Mills, Richard Primus,
Angela Riley, Margo Schlander, Wenona Singel, the Friday Forum, the
Montana crew, the Berkeley and Michigan law faculties, and the Strict
Scrutiny podcast.
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INTRODUCTION
McGirt v. Oklahoma, decided at the end of the 2019 Term, is a
momentous, paradigm-shifting decision that has already altered the Indian
law landscape.2 But McGirt is also a case that underscores the fault lines in
our textualism—both majority and dissent claimed to offer the textualist
result but reached strikingly divergent answers. It turns out that Indian law,
long considered a “tiny backwater” of constitutional law,3 is an area where
textualists duel over which texts matter and why, offering important insights
into the defining conflict of the Roberts Court.4 Textualism’s focus on the
written word presumptively diverts attention away from the impact of race
1

1

140 S. Ct. 2452 (2020).
See generally United States–Muscogee (Creek) Nation Treaty — Federal Indian Law —
Disestablishment of Indian Reservations — McGirt v. Oklahoma, 134 HARV. L. REV. 600, 605–09 (2020)
(discussing the trend in recent federal Indian law).
3 Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and
Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 HARV. L. REV. 381, 383 (1993).
4 See generally Tara Leigh Grove, Comment, Which Textualism?, 134 HARV. L. REV. 265, 266, 279–
90 (2020) (identifying “important tensions within textualism”).
2
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and ethnicity on judicial processes.5 What is missing is a candid assessment
of the salient judicial biases that influence textualism. Federal Indian law is
a perfect foil to explore the tectonic forces at play in that struggle.
Felix Cohen originally proposed the metaphor of the miner’s canary
that, for decades, contextualized Indian tribes in the constitutional canon,6
and even today is considered “a barometer for the constitutional soul of the
United States.”7 The miner’s canary was a caged bird used to detect when
the air in the mine became dangerously toxic. A dead or dying canary was a
warning to others. In Cohen’s time, the miner’s canary metaphor was a
powerful defense against illiberal forces seeking a “final solution” to the
Indian problem.8 If Indian tribes in America failed, then other marginalized
groups could follow. More recently, Professors Lani Guinier and Gerald
Torres employed the miner’s canary metaphor more broadly to advocate for
“[t]hose who are racially marginalized.”9
But even for a metaphor as dark as the miner’s canary, there is an even
darker side. The metaphor presumes that Indian tribes are passive, caged
birds waiting for outside forces to decide their fates. Indians and tribes are
weak, powerless, and ultimately inferior to the forces that could save them,
the forces with the power and ability to act that require warning before they

5 It is a tenet of critical race theory that textualist (and originalist) judges’ methodology is harmful to
the interests of racial minorities. See, e.g., Roy L. Brooks, Brown v. Board of Education Fifty Years Later:
A Critical Race Theory Perspective, 47 HOW. L.J. 581, 588 (2004) (“African Americans have much to
fear in Justice Scalia’s jurisprudence.”). In federal Indian law cases, the late Professor David Getches
argued that textualists should “adhere to the foundational Indian law cases and, absent clear textual
treatment in congressional legislation, resist the temptation to fill in gaps or introduce the judge’s own
preferences to redefine the historic political arrangement between tribes and the United States.” David.
H. Getches, Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnquist Court’s Pursuit of States’ Rights, Color-Blind Justice
and Mainstream Values, 86 MINN. L. REV. 267, 301 (2001). But the Supreme Court’s textualist
precedents (prior to McGirt) have made it abundantly clear that they have not done so. Id.
6 Felix S. Cohen, The Erosion of Indian Rights, 1950-1953: A Case Study in Bureaucracy, 62 YALE
L.J. 348, 390 (1953) (“Like the miner’s canary, the Indian marks the shifts from fresh air to poison gas
in our political atmosphere; and our treatment of Indians, even more than our treatment of other
minorities, reflects the rise and fall in our democratic faith.”); see e.g., Steven Paul McSloy, The “Miner’s
Canary:” A Bird’s Eye View of American Indian Law and Its Future, 37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 733, 733,
738 (2003) (referencing Cohen’s discussion of the phrase); Rennard Strickland, Indian Law and the
Miner’s Canary: The Signs of Poison Gas, 39 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 483, 483 (1991) (crediting Cohen with
coining the phrase).
7 Maggie Blackhawk, Federal Indian Law as Paradigm Within Public Law, 132 HARV. L. REV.
1787, 1801 (2019).
8 New Rider v. Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Pawnee Cnty., 414 U.S. 1097, 1101 (1973)
(Douglas, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari) (quoting S. REP. NO. 91-501, at 13–14 (1969)).
9 LANI GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER’S CANARY: ENLISTING RACE, RESISTING POWER,
TRANSFORMING DEMOCRACY 11 (2002).
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act. At its heart is the trope of the vanishing Indian. 10 “[O]rdinary
Americans,” to borrow Justice Samuel Alito’s phrasing, 11 often express
surprise when they see Indians and tribes do more than merely host
powwows and operate casinos.12 In these observers’ minds, the only likely
conflict is whether the end of Indian tribes will be compassionate or ruthless.
As I have argued elsewhere, many people believe and act like Indians
and tribes should no longer exist, that they died out in the past, and that their
inferiority condemned them (sadly perhaps) to extinction.13 Indians almost
did vanish, but they did not. One can peruse the cultural stories of Indigenous
peoples, including that of my own, the Michigan Anishinaabeg, and see
why. 14 Judges too often seek to enforce the role of Indians and tribes as
canaries—passive, captive, and weak. These judges employ a kind of
textualism that presumes the inferiority of Indians and tribes. The judges
assume without evidence that tribal governance is normatively substandard
compared to federal, state, and local governance.15 What tribes actually do,
10 Cf. Kathryn E. Fort, The Vanishing Indian Returns: Tribes, Popular Originalism, and the Supreme
Court, 57 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 297, 299 (2013) (“Unpacking what the Court is doing in its American Indian
law cases can demonstrate its assumptions about the role of tribes in the United States. And that
assumption is that they should no longer exist.”).
11 Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1767 (2020) (Alito, J., dissenting).
12 Cf. Kevin Noble Maillard, Parental Ratification: Legal Manifestations of Cultural Authenticity in
Cross-Racial Adoption, 28 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 107, 131–39 (2003) (surveying stereotypes about Indians
employed by judges in Indian Child Welfare Act cases). See generally ANTON TREUER, EVERYTHING
YOU WANTED TO KNOW ABOUT INDIANS BUT WERE AFRAID TO ASK 128–37 (2012) (answering
questions typically asked by non-Indians about Indians and tribes).
13 MATTHEW L.M. FLETCHER, THE GHOST ROAD: ANISHINAABE RESPONSES TO INDIAN-HATING, at
xi–xiv (2020) [hereinafter FLETCHER, THE GHOST ROAD] (arguing that many Americans resent Indians
or do not recognize Indian-hating because Indians are now American citizens); cf. id. at 34 (“The first
policy makers, the Founders, were not even consistent on what their goals were in relation to Indian
affairs, with one exception – they wanted Indians gone.”).
14 See, e.g., id. at 73–82 (telling the Anishinaabe story of the defeat of Paul Bunyan by a trickster
god named Nanaboozhoo and arguing that a prominent legal philosopher incorrectly assumes Indian
people are passive actors with no agency); Jonodev Chaudhuri, Reflection on McGirt v. Oklahoma,
134 HARV. L. REV. F. 82, 82–83 (2020) (telling the Muscogee story of Corn Woman and discussing the
Court’s opinion in Johnson v. M’Intosh falsely portraying Muscogee culture as unable to cultivate and
control Indian land).
15 See, e.g., Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 384–85 (2001) (Souter, J., concurring) (describing tribal
laws as “unusually difficult for an outsider to sort out”). The lengthy history of commentators asserting
the inferiority of tribal governments, and in particular tribal courts, is exemplified by the work of
Professor Samuel J. Brakel, director of the American Bar Foundation’s study of tribal courts in the 1970s.
See SAMUEL J. BRAKEL, AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBAL COURTS: THE COSTS OF SEPARATE JUSTICE 103–05
(1978) (arguing for the abandonment of tribal courts); Samuel J. Brakel, American Indian Tribal Courts:
Separate? “Yes,” Equal? “Probably Not,” 62 A.B.A. J. 1002, 1002–06 (1976) (discussing the inferiority
of tribal courts). Brakel’s study arrived at the same time as Professor Getches’s study, which relied upon
data rather than anecdotes. Though Getches’s study similarly found weaknesses in tribal courts, the study
ultimately encouraged procedural improvements to protect the tribal justice system. See NAT’L AM.
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and how Indians actually govern themselves and others, is usually
irrelevant.16 This is Canary Textualism.17
This Article draws upon the aadizookaan (sacred stories) of the
Anishinaabeg to employ a competing metaphor, the metaphor of the
muskrat. 18 The muskrat is the hero of the story of the great flood that
destroyed the world, a critical origin story for the Anishinaabeg. While the
stronger animals and the trickster god Nanaboozhoo floated on the water,
despairing and close to drowning, it was the humble and lowly muskrat that
dove the farthest down to reach the ground, bringing back a single pawful of
dirt that Nanaboozhoo used to magically recreate the world.19 Indians know
a thing or two about apocalyptic destruction, and the muskrat is the symbol
of the humility, courage, and thoughtfulness that guided the Anishinaabeg
back from near extinction.20
Many Indians thrive in our modern era, operating governments that
often govern more effectively than their non-Indian neighbors.21 Indian tribes
are active, innovative, and disruptive (in a good way).22 Indian tribes now

INDIAN CT. JUDGES ASS’N, INDIAN COURTS AND THE FUTURE 85–87, 103–09 (Judge Orville N. Olney &
David Getches eds., 1978). For a discussion of the historical significance of Getches’ report, see Matthew
L.M. Fletcher, Indian Courts and Fundamental Fairness: Indian Courts and the Future Revisited, 84 U.
COLO. L. REV. 59, 64–70 (2013).
16 Professor Kathryn Fort put it best when she concluded that the judiciary attempts “to enforce a
history of assimilation . . . . [b]y focusing on the continued limitation of tribal sovereignty.” Fort, supra
note 10, at 338.
17 While Canary Textualism is an original term coined for this Article, criticism of the Court’s Indian
law jurisprudence has focused on Canary Textualism’s hallmarks, including the Court’s assumption of
the power to determine national Indian affairs policy. See, e.g., David H. Getches, Conquering the
Cultural Frontier: The New Subjectivism of the Supreme Court in Indian Law, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1573,
1582 (1996) (“Indian rights are losing the limited protection they had as the Court forsakes foundation
principles and expands the ambit of control over Indian tribes to include not just congressional but also
judicial power to redefine and restrict tribal sovereignty.”); Philip P. Frickey, (Native) American
Exceptionalism in Federal Public Law, 119 HARV. L. REV. 433, 454 (2005) (noting that in reservationboundaries cases, “the Court aggrandized a power to act in the absence of clear congressional directives
— a dormant plenary power over Indian affairs, if you will”).
18 One version of the muskrat’s role in the Anishinaabe creation story is reproduced in FLETCHER,
THE GHOST ROAD, supra note 13, at 3.
19 Id. For another version of the Anishinaabe creation story, see EDWARD BENTON-BENAI, THE
MISHOMIS BOOK: THE VOICE OF THE OJIBWAY 29–34 (1979).
20 Perhaps this metaphor falls flat on some level because, as many Anishinaabe people know, the
courageous muskrat dies after saving the world. I like to think the muskrat’s sacrifice represents the
sacrifice my Anishinaabe ancestors made to preserve our culture, language, and lands.
21 Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Indian Tribes Are Governing Well. It’s the States that Are Failing, WASH.
MONTHLY (Sept. 30, 2021), https://washingtonmonthly.com/2021/09/30/indian-tribes-are-governingwell-its-the-states-that-are-failing/ [https://perma.cc/65RJ-KXWH].
22 Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Tribal Disruption and Federalism, 76 MONT. L. REV. 97, 103 (2015)
(“Tribal disruption theory posits that tribal governance initiatives that interfere with state and local
governance may generate short-term harms that are abated by long-term comparative advantage.”).
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exercise self-determination, engaging in active sovereignty and innovative
government. 23 Tribes are leaders in good governance. 24 Indian tribes no
longer wait around for the federal government to grant them powers, they
earn their sovereignty. 25 The miner’s canary metaphor does not describe
modern tribes. The struggles of tribes are not warnings to non-Indians; if
anything, now the struggles of non-Indians are warnings to tribes. More and
more, non-Indian governments turn to Indian tribes for leadership and
invention. Professor Phil Frickey could be said to have seen the need for
more engaged scholarship on Indian law and policy with his passionate call
in the mid-2000s for more practical and pragmatic scholarly work, or what
he called “pragmatic instrumentalism,”26 that would describe and analyze the
lived experience of tribes.
Like the muskrat, Indian tribes take initiative, make their own choices,
and impact the world in positive ways; they are laboratories of democracy.27
A judge acknowledging this reality would adopt an attitude allowing the
marketplace of governmental ideas to develop. That often means deferring
to acts of Congress or federal regulations that have been enacted or
promulgated with tribal interests, while applying the default canons that
instruct treaties and statutes designed to benefit tribal interests to be

23 See Michael L.M. Fletcher, Retiring the “Deadliest Enemies” Model of Tribal-State Relations,
43 TULSA L. REV. 73, 86–87 (2007) [hereinafter Fletcher, Retiring the “Deadliest Enemies”]; see also
Randall K.Q. Akee, Katherine A. Spilde & Jonathan B. Taylor, The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act and
Its Effects on American Indian Economic Development, 29 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 185, 186, 196–203
(2015) (describing the impacts of the $30 billion Indian gaming industry on tribal governments); Wenona
T. Singel, The Institutional Economics of Tribal Labor Relations, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 487, 498–503
(describing tribal labor laws); CONF. OF W. ATT’YS GEN., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW DESKBOOK, §§ 14:1–
:76 (2020 ed.) (surveying numerous tribal–state intergovernmental agreements).
24 See Angela R. Riley, Good (Native) Governance, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1049, 1052–55, 1125
(2007) (proposing a theory of good Native governance that is broader than the conventional Western
view); see also Kristen A. Carpenter & Angela R. Riley, Indigenous Peoples and the Jurisgenerative
Moment in Human Rights, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 173, 233 (2014) (emphasizing the development of human
rights in Indigenous governance); Wenona T. Singel, Indian Tribes and Human Rights Accountability,
49 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 567, 579–85 (2012) (describing tribal self-governance as a means to benefit the
community).
25 See Fletcher, Retiring the “Deadliest Enemies,” supra note 23, at 81–87.
26 Philip P. Frickey, Address at University of Kansas Conference on Tribal Law and Institutions,
Feb. 2, 2008, Tribal Law, Tribal Context, and the Federal Courts, 18 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 24, 28–32
(2008); see also Matthew L.M. Fletcher, American Indian Legal Scholarship and the Courts: Heeding
Frickey’s Call, 4 CALIF. L. REV. CIR. 1, 7–11 (2013) (summarizing Professor Frickey’s appeal for a new
type of Indian law scholarship grounded in the realities of Indian Country).
27 See, e.g., Wenona T. Singel, The First Federalists, 62 DRAKE L. REV. 775, 830–44 (2014)
(describing the tribal legislative process and its advantages); Elizabeth Ann Kronk Warner, Tribes as
Innovative Environmental “Laboratories,” 86 U. COLO. L. REV. 789, 831–46 (2015) (arguing that tribal
governments are ideal laboratories of environmental law).

969

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

interpreted in light of that purpose.28 And when no federal text controls, a
judge would adopt a wait-and-see approach and would apply default rules—
such as the clear statement rules—which limits the judiciary’s preferences.29
This approach is Muskrat Textualism. As the following discussion will show,
Muskrat Textualism is normatively superior in every way to Canary
Textualism.
Muskrat Textualism has been on the ascent in the federal and state
judiciaries for several years now, 30 but Canary Textualism remains a
powerful force. In McGirt, however, a case with enormous political and legal
implications, Muskrat Textualism prevailed. McGirt was a dispute about the
boundaries of the Creek Reservation, 31 considered by most to have been
extinguished long ago,32 and the future of criminal jurisdiction over wide
swaths of the State of Oklahoma. 33 Oklahoma lost. 34 In a parallel case,
Oklahoma attempted to frame the issue in the classic canary metaphor by
including a color photo of the Tulsa skyline35 and a color map showing the
broad swath of Oklahoma’s reservations, 36 implying that the Muscogee
(Creek) Nation’s sovereignty was ancient, inferior, and threatening.37 The
28 MATTHEW L.M. FLETCHER, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, §§ 5.4–.5 (2016) [hereinafter FLETCHER,
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW].
29 Id. § 5.6.
30 See, e.g., United States v. Cooley, No. 19-1414, slip op. at *5–9 (U.S. June 1, 2021) (finding that
the provisions in question do not show a clear statement from Congress to infringe on tribal sovereignty);
Wash. State Dep’t of Licensing v. Cougar Den, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 1000, 1016 (2019) (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring) (interpreting the treaty in question in the way the Indians would have understood the terms);
Upper Skagit Indian Tribe v. Lundgren, 138 S. Ct. 1649, 1652–55 (2018) (concluding that “restraint is
the best use of discretion” when confronted with a novel question of tribal sovereign immunity); United
States v. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954, 1966 (2016) (upholding cases tried under the Indian Civil Rights Act
as predicate offenses to be integrated with other federal statutes); Nebraska v. Parker, 557 U.S. 481, 488–
90 (2016) (finding no clear indication that Congress intended to diminish the tribal reservation); Michigan
v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 790 (2014) (requiring a clear decision from Congress before
infringing on tribal sovereignty); In re Dependency of Z.J.G., 471 P.3d 853, 856, 866 (Wash. 2020)
(invoking the canon that requires liberal construction in favor of Native tribes).
31 McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452, 2459–60 (2020).
32 See Philip H. Tinker, Is Oklahoma Still Indian Country? “Justifiable Expectations” and
Reservation Disestablishment in Murphy v. Sirmons and Osage Nation v. Irby, 9 DARTMOUTH L.J. 120,
156 (2011).
33 See Elizabeth A. Reese, Welcome to the Maze: Race, Justice, and Jurisdiction in McGirt v.
Oklahoma, U. CHI. L. REV. ONLINE (Aug. 13, 2020), https://lawreviewblog.uchicago.edu/2020/08/13/
mcgirt-reese/ [https://perma.cc/5E2V-W6WS].
34 McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2482. That same day, the Supreme Court decided an analogous case regarding
the Creek Reservation boundary by adopting the reasoning in McGirt. See Sharp v. Murphy, 140 S. Ct.
2412, 2412 (2020).
35 Brief of Petitioner at 3, Carpenter v. Murphy, 140 S. Ct. 2412 (2020) (No. 17-1107).
36 Id. at 2.
37 See id. at 2–3 (arguing that affirming the lower courts’ conclusion would “reincarnate” over three
million acres into Indian Territory, thereby “overturn[ing] 111 years of Oklahoma history”).
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Court was not persuaded. Justice Neil Gorsuch, for a bare majority,
emphasized that courts should not “substitut[e] stories for statutes”38 and that
the “rule of the strong” must give way to the “rule of law.”39 Normally, these
are innocuous sentiments. But in an Indian law decision in which the Court
split 5–4 and in which as many as 1.8 million Americans were affected,40
these statements comprised an audacious shot across the bow of Canary
Textualism. The shocking novelty of McGirt v. Oklahoma is that the Court
did not succumb to the temptation of Canary Textualism.41
If Muskrat Textualism is the new way, then what of the old way? This
Article targets Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, the 1978 decision that
stripped tribes of the power to prosecute non-Indians by virtue of an
“unspoken assumption” that tribes never possessed that power, 42 as the
worst—and most vulnerable—offender in the canon of Canary Textualism.
Scholars have long criticized Oliphant, pointing to its embrace of
ethnocentric views of the inferiority of Indian people and tribal governments,
and rightfully so. But few, if any, scholars have offered substantive proposals
to eradicate cases like Oliphant from the canon, other than to say it was
wrongly decided.43 Recent generations of Indian law scholars, namely Indian
people themselves, have begun to describe how modern tribal governments

38

McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2470.
Id. at 2474.
40 Id. at 2458, 2479.
41 Cf. Gregory Ablavsky, McGirt: Gorsuch Affirms “Rule of Law,” Not “Rule of the Strong,” in Key
Federal Indian Law Decision, STAN. L. SCH. BLOGS: LEGAL AGGREGATE (July 10, 2020), https://
law.stanford.edu/2020/07/10/mcgirt-gorsuch-affirms-rule-of-law-not-rule-of-the-strong-in-key-federalindian-law-decision/ [https://perma.cc/L8RE-UZ79] (“Arguably, all the decision did was decline to craft
a different legal standard for when the stakes were high than for when the stakes were perceived to be
low.”).
42 435 U.S. 191, 201–12 (1978).
43 See, e.g., ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., LIKE A LOADED WEAPON: THE REHNQUIST COURT, INDIAN
RIGHTS, AND THE LEGAL HISTORY OF RACISM IN AMERICA 97–113 (2005) (emphasizing that Oliphant
perpetuates a judicial philosophy grounded in racism); DAVID E. WILKINS, AMERICAN INDIAN
SOVEREIGNTY AND THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: THE MASKING OF JUSTICE 210–13 (1997) (arguing that
Oliphant racializes tribal–state–federal jurisdiction over Indian Country); see also Sarah Krakoff, Mark
the Plumber v. Tribal Empire, or Non-Indian Anxiety v. Tribal Sovereignty?: The Story of Oliphant v.
Suquamish Indian Tribe, in INDIAN LAW STORIES 261, 280 & n.69 (Carole Goldberg, Kevin K. Washburn
& Philip P. Frickey eds., 2011) (summarizing the Oliphant decision and consolidating critical scholarly
works).
39
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operate44 and why Indian law is important.45 One could say this endeavor is
a form of Muskrat scholarship. Building on the work of scholars such as
Professors Wenona Singel46 and Michalyn Steele,47 this Article fills a gap by
linking that scholarship to the dominant interpretive methodology in the
Supreme Court, textualism, and looks to further the normatively superior
work of Muskrat textualists. If Muskrat Textualism holds, as it should, then
Oliphant should be considered a dead letter.
Part I of this Article describes Canary Textualism. This form of
textualism is rigorous, but it also can be understood (like Justice Antonin
Scalia described himself) as “faint-hearted”48 when the text’s plain meaning
is unclear or where a text is absent. In Indian law, which virtually everyone
believes is confounding, Canary Textualism is unrecognizable as textualism,
appearing more like pure policy preferences thinly disguised. While it is true
that Indian affairs are complicated, it should be relatively simple for the
judiciary. Canonical and ancient interpretative rules adopted and applied by
the judiciary itself, such as the canons of construction of Indian treaties and
statutes and the clear statement rules, should make Indian law less
complicated for judges. 49 But Canary Textualists will deviate from the
default rules to enforce policy preferences, citing policy objections based on
assumed facts on the ground. This textualism often intervenes, before
Congress or tribes can act, effectively enforcing the passivity of tribal
governments. Canary Textualism therefore prioritizes a top-down approach
to Indian law, with a federal–state–tribal hierarchy, and occasionally makes
embarrassing mistakes, such as Oliphant.

44 See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Reese, The Other American Law, 73 STAN. L. REV. 555, 584–85 (2021)
(describing numerous examples of tribal governmental innovations); Angela R. Riley, (Tribal)
Sovereignty and Illiberalism, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 799, 835–48 (2007) (arguing in defense of tribal civil
rights norms).
45 See, e.g., Blackhawk, supra note 7 at 1804 n.74 (arguing that federal Indian law is a canonical part
of public law); Seth Davis, The Constitution of Our Tribal Republic, 65 UCLA L. REV. 1460, 1463–65
(2018) (arguing partly that modern tribal intergovernmental agreements are akin to historic Indian treaties
as a matter of constitutional law).
46 See, e.g., Singel, supra note 27, at 777–83 (arguing that the judiciary should acknowledge the
important innovations on governance when rendering decisions involving federalism matters).
47 Michalyn Steele, Plenary Power, Political Questions, and Sovereignty in Indian Affairs, 63 UCLA
L. REV. 666, 668–74 (2016) (arguing that Congress, not the judiciary, possesses the institutional capacity
to address the scope and contours of inherent tribal powers).
48 Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 864 (1989) (“I hasten to
confess that in a crunch I may prove a faint-hearted originalist. I cannot imagine myself, any more than
any other federal judge, upholding a statute that imposes the punishment of flogging.”). Admittedly,
originalism and textualism are different judicial philosophies. Because Justice Scalia employed both
philosophies, they are used interchageably in this Article.
49 See supra notes 28–29 and accompanying text.

972

116:963 (2022)

Muskrat Textualism

Part II engages with Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe. Oliphant is
almost universally reviled by advocates of tribal sovereignty and almost as
universally unknown within the public law universe. This Part strips the
decision down to its essence and its individual parts, showing how the Court
applied Canary Textualism to reach a decision contrary to federal policy and
its own precedents. Oliphant was a case of first impression for the Court—
and for the entire federal judiciary. The Court intervened to adopt a brightline rule applicable to all Indian tribes that held that no tribe could prosecute
a non-Indian criminal offender, despite a lack of congressional guidance on
the question. The basis of the decision was an unspoken assumption rooted
entirely in the long history of federal officials assuming Indian people are
racially inferior. This approach is Canary Textualism writ large.
Part III describes Muskrat Textualism. Muskrat Textualism puts Canary
Textualism to shame. There is nothing faint-hearted about it. It places a
premium on “semantic context”;50 that is, the meaning of the word controls
over the intent of the legislature or the policy preferences of the judges. This
textualism highlights government-to-government relations in geopolitical
and federalism terms. In this school, tribes are laboratories of democracy,
contributing to the marketplace of governance theories. Muskrat Textualism
is patient, waiting for Congress and tribes to act before intervening. Muskrat
textualists are faithful to the default interpretative rules specific to Indian
law. Muskrat Textualism encourages the bottom-up thinking that Congress
has prioritized since the 1970s, giving tribes room to propose, adopt, and
implement solutions. If things go badly, Congress can then step in.
McGirt v. Oklahoma is the defining opinion of Muskrat Textualism.
That case held that the Creek Reservation boundaries remained extant,
rejecting the assumptions of the state and federal governments, non-Indians,
and even some Indians and tribes that considered the reservation
relinquished. The Court prioritized the semantic meaning of the relevant
treaties and acts of Congress, then filled gaps with the default interpretive
rules that prioritized the prerogatives of Congress and the tribes over the
preferences of the states and the judges.
Part IV ponders the implications of Muskrat Textualism. This Article
shows that Oliphant is incompatible with Muskrat Textualism and should be
overruled. Muskrat Textualism can and should be used to address specific
areas of current dispute, particularly challenges to the Indian Child Welfare
Act.

50

Grove, supra note 4, at 269.
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I.

CANARY TEXTUALISM

The Justices of the Roberts Court have consistently identified as
textualists. “[W]e’re all textualists now,” is the common refrain.51 Justice
Scalia’s relentlessly influential polemic, A Matter of Interpretation, is the
go-to guide for twenty-first-century judging. Scalian textualism is the
counterpoint to several jurisprudential theories—primarily legal realism, but
also any other form of purposivism.52 Justice Scalia situated his textualism
as the only proper theory of judging in a world where judges (federal judges,
anyway) are unelected, life tenured, and antidemocratic. It is probably fair to
say that Scalia’s insistence on textualism drove the Court in the direction of
textualism as the dominant methodology of the judiciary. 53 Chief Justice
John Roberts’s famed statement that judges are like umpires who “call balls
and strikes” serves as the layperson’s gloss on what this textualism means.54
That is to say, judges merely read, apply, and (only as a last resort) interpret
the law. Textualism is so dominant today as a judging philosophy in large
part because it merely restates what everyone already assumed judges do—
judges are not supposed to make law or policy; they apply law and policy
dispassionately.
As argued elsewhere, I have grave misgivings with textualism for a
variety of reasons.55 Part I focuses on how textualism has worked in the last
several decades of Indian affairs cases in the Supreme Court. This Part
concludes that some judges are willing to depart from their textualist
shackles more easily or quickly than others when Indians and tribes are likely
to prevail. Justices Scalia and Gorsuch, who never overlapped on the Court
but who are both considered archtextualist judges, are my primary foils.
A. What Is Canary Textualism?
Canary Textualism is judicial maximalism in federal Indian law.
Canary textualist judges view Indians and Indian tribes as passive recipients
51 Harvard Law School, The 2015 Scalia Lecture | A Dialogue with Justice Elena Kagan on the
Reading of Statutes, YOUTUBE, at 08:28 (Nov. 25, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
dpEtszFT0Tg [https://perma.cc/FBK5-XCMN]; see also Grove, supra note 4, at 265 n.1 (emphasizing
the increasing prominence of textualism).
52 See Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States
Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 18–25 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
53 Jonathan R. Siegel, The Legacy of Justice Scalia and His Textualist Ideal, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
857, 870–74 (2017).
54 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief Justice of the United
States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 56 (2005) (statement of John G.
Roberts, Jr., J., D.C. Cir.).
55 Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Textualism’s Gaze, 25 MICH. J. RACE & L. 111, 144–46 (2020)
[hereinafter Fletcher, Textualism’s Gaze].
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of federal law and policy, with little or no input in the process. These judges
invoke the federal plenary power over Indian affairs to enforce the legal and
political inferiority of Indian tribes. These judges consider tribal
governmental innovations and economic development activities as threats to
state governments, private businesses, and property interests. Canary
textualists intervene before Congress can act, ostensibly to protect nonIndian and state interests from tribes. Canary textualists regularly invoke
policy preferences over the text. They are willing to deviate from the default
Indian law interpretative rules. Canary textualists regularly assert that Indian
law is confusing and irregular, the declaration of which provides space for
mischief.
Examples of Canary Textualism abound, even in cases in which tribal
interests prevail. For example, in Kiowa Tribe v. Manufacturing
Technologies, a case in which the Court affirmed tribal sovereign
immunity, 56 three dissenters would have held that tribes possessed no
immunity for off-reservation commercial activities even where Congress had
supported tribal immunity.57 The majority was openly critical of upholding
tribal immunity. The Court assumed without evidence that Indian tribes will
injure non-Indian interests without providing a remedy and therefore should
not be outside the reach of federal court jurisdiction. 58 Years later in
Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, when the Court again affirmed
tribal immunity,59 there were then four dissenters. Notably, Justice Scalia—
having previously joined the majority in Kiowa 60 —changed his position,
writing: “Rather than insist that Congress clean up a mess that I helped make,
I would overrule Kiowa.”61
Observers could argue that this textualism is not textualism at all, and
there is a great deal of force to this characterization.62 But this Article takes
the judges at their word. Even Justice Scalia’s faint-hearted brand of
textualism purports to grant primacy to the text.63 At the point where the text

56

523 U.S. 751, 753 (1998).
Id. at 760 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also id. at 759 (majority opinion) (emphasizing that
Congress has the authority to dispense with tribal sovereign immunity, but had not done so).
58 See id. at 758 (majority opinion) (“There are reasons to doubt the wisdom of perpetuating the
doctrine. . . . In this economic context, immunity can harm those who are unaware that they are dealing
with a tribe, who do not know of tribal immunity, or who have no choice in the matter, as in the case of
tort victims.”). However, the Court ultimately “defer[red] to the role Congress may wish to exercise in
this important judgment.” Id.
59 572 U.S. 782, 785 (2014).
60 523 U.S. at 752.
61 Bay Mills, 572 U.S. at 814 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
62 Fletcher, supra note 55, at 118–19.
63 Scalia, supra note 48, at 861–62.
57
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becomes ambiguous, a Scalian textualist merely engages in the game of
persuasion, that is, which position can garner the most votes. Justice Scalia
early and often recognized the limits of a purer form of textualism, claiming
to be a textualist, not “a nut,” unlike, say, Justice Clarence Thomas (again, I
borrow from Scalia himself).64 Even with this gaping hole, we will see that a
Canary textualist departs even more quickly from textualism for reasons
unique to Indian law.
In the Indian law context, Justice Scalia’s textualism is captured in an
internal memorandum from Justice Scalia to Justice William Brennan, taken
from Justice Thurgood Marshall’s files in Duro v. Reina.65 Scalia wrote:
[O]ur opinions in this field have not posited an original state of affairs that can
subsequently be altered only by explicit legislation, but have rather sought to
discern what the current state of affairs ought to be by taking into account all
legislation, and the congressional “expectations” that it reflects, down to the
present day. I would not have taken that approach as an original matter, but it
seems too deeply imbedded in our jurisprudence to be changed at this stage. 66

The Duro memo could be read as a declaration that federal Indian law is so
riddled with policy-based decision-making as to justify an entirely atextualist
approach. Scalia’s memo should be seen as a Canary Textualism manifesto.
It is an announcement that the faint-hearted textualist has seen enough of
federal Indian law to toss aside the shackles of textualism. The memo came
on the heels of Scalia’s vote with the majority in Mississippi Band of
Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield,67 a vote he would later claim to be the most
difficult vote of his career, a vote mandated by his textualism.68 The Duro
memo suggests that Scalia would no longer feel constrained, at least
regarding Indian law matters not governed by the plain language of a statute.
The memo neatly separates out an “original[ist]” position from an
“ought-to-be” position. Importantly, Scalia explicitly rejected the clear

64 Joe Patrice, Scalia Calls Thomas ‘A Nut,’ ABOVE THE LAW (July 11, 2014), https://
abovethelaw.com/2014/07/scalia-calls-thomas-a-nut/ [https://perma.cc/3F37-S4QM] (recounting Justice
Scalia saying, “Look, I’m an originalist, but I’m not a nut,” when asked to compare Justice Thomas’s
judicial philosophy with his own).
65 Memorandum from Justice Antonin Scalia to Justice William Brennan, Jr. (April 4, 1990)
[hereinafter Scalia Memorandum]. The memo is reproduced in FLETCHER, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra
note 28, § 7.6.
66 Scalia Memorandum, supra note 65 (emphasis added).
67 490 U.S. 30, 31 (1989).
68 Adam Liptak, Case Pits Adoptive Parents Against Tribal Rights, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 24, 2012),
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/25/us/american-indian-adoption-case-comes-to-supreme-court.html
[https://perma.cc/4S7W-97JU] (recalling Justice Scalia’s explanation that he was bound to his decision
because “that’s what the law said, without a doubt”).
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statement rules on tribal powers. As we will see, by referencing
“congressional ‘expectations,’” Scalia endorsed Canary Textualism.
Scalia wrote relatively few Indian law opinions,69 but when he did, he
was forthright in announcing that his vote was driven by policy concerns. As
noted above, he wrote in Bay Mills that he had changed his mind about tribal
sovereign immunity on policy grounds, lamenting a perceived “mess” he
helped to create and which Congress failed to resolve to his satisfaction.
Later, he wrote in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, an Indian Child Welfare
Act case, that he was voting for the biological father on men’s-rights
grounds,70 another apparent policy-oriented vote.
Perhaps Justice Scalia’s Indian law record is predictable, given his
politics. He rarely voted in favor of tribal interests, and when he did, it was
usually because he seemed to have discerned there was no room for a rational
textualist to depart from the text.71 When he did depart, which was frequent,
and he put on his policymaker hat, he was viciously anti-tribal. 72 Justice
Scalia did not invent Canary Textualism, but he perfected it. And for years,
the Court followed his lead.73
Canary Textualism’s pursuit of judicial policy preferences stands in
stark opposition to the stated default interpretive rules that had governed
federal Indian law since the early nineteenth century.
69 See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Justice Scalia’s Indian Law Record, TURTLE TALK (Feb. 17, 2016),
https://turtletalk.blog/2016/02/17/justice-scalias-indian-law-record/ [https://perma.cc/5CLQ-JATA].
70 570 U.S. 637, 667–68 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
71 Scalia joined opinions supporting tribal interests where there was no room for textual
interpretation. See, e.g., Cherokee Nation v. Leavitt, 543 U.S. 631, 633–34 (2005) (“The United States
and two Indian Tribes have entered into agreements in which the Government promises to pay certain
‘contract support costs’ that the Tribes incurred during fiscal years (FYs) 1994 through 1997. The
question before us is whether the Government’s promises are legally binding. We conclude that they
are.”); Kiowa Tribe v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 754 (1998) (“As a matter of
federal law, an Indian tribe is subject to suit only where Congress has authorized the suit or the tribe has
waived its immunity.”).
72 See, e.g., Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 814 (2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(“I concurred in [Kiowa]. For the reasons given today in Justice Thomas’s dissenting opinion, which I
join, I am now convinced that Kiowa was wrongly decided; that, in the intervening 16 years, its error has
grown more glaringly obvious; and that stare decisis does not recommend its retention. Rather than insist
that Congress clean up a mess that I helped make, I would overrule Kiowa and reverse the judgment
below.”); Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 354, 371–72 (2001) (referring to Montana v. United States,
which allowed tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers who threaten a tribe’s political integrity, as “an
opinion, bear in mind, not a statute”). But see Adoptive Couple, 570 U.S. at 667–68 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(stating that he would rule in favor of tribal interests in part based on policy grounds favoring the rights
of a biological parent).
73 See City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 217–21 (2005) (applying equitable
doctrine of laches to a tribe’s claim to a tax immunity despite favorable federal statutes); Duro v. Reina,
495 U.S. 676, 679 (1990) (stripping tribes of criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians despite the
absence of contrary statutory statements); Getches, supra note 5, at 306 (describing Justice Scalia’s Duro
memo as a “manifesto”).
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B. Indian Law Default Interpretive Rules
Canary Textualism’s principal foil is the default interpretative rules that
require the judiciary to defer to Congress and Indian tribes. These default
rules, unique to Indian law, include the canons of interpreting Indian
treaties74 and Indian affairs statutes,75 and the clear statement rules applicable
to tribal sovereign interests. 76 Such interpretative rules should make the
judiciary’s job easier. But the lengths to which Canary textualists will go to
avoid these rules are impressively complex.
It is well settled that Congress has the plenary power to determine the
contours of federal, tribal, and state relationships.77 It is also well settled that
the United States owes a “duty of protection” to individual Indians and
Indian tribes78—or what the courts usually refer to as a trust obligation.79
Dating back to the earliest foundational cases in federal Indian law, the
Supreme Court adopted a series of prophylactic rules that realize the federal
government’s duty of protection. This Article is most concerned with the
clear statement rules of federal Indian law providing that reservation
boundaries, tribal sovereign immunity, Indian tax immunities, treaty rights,
and inherent tribal powers remain extant absent a clear statement (or
expression) of intent by Congress to abrogate or modify them.80
Examples abound of the application of these rules. In Ex parte Crow
Dog, the Court found that the federal government could not prosecute an
Indian for a crime against another Indian in Indian Country without a federal
statute authorizing the prosecution that demonstrated “a clear expression of
74 See generally Indian Canon Originalism, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1100, 1100–01 (2013) (outlining the
Indian canon of construction as applied to treaties).
75 See generally Alex Tallchief Skibine, Textualism and the Indian Canons of Statutory Construction,
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM (forthcoming Mar. 2022) (manuscript at 5–9), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
a=3813569 [https://perma.cc/S43M-K9L9] (explaining how courts developed Indian canons of statutory
construction).
76 See generally FLETCHER, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 28, § 5.6 (defining the clear statement
rules).
77 See, e.g., United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004) (“[T]he Constitution grants Congress
broad general powers to legislate in respect to Indian tribes, powers that we have consistently described
as ‘plenary and exclusive.’” (quoting Washington v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of the Yakima Indian
Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 470 (1979))).
78 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 556, 560–61 (1832), abrogated by McClanahan v.
Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973), as recognized in White Mountain Apache Tribe v.
Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980).
79 See, e.g., United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 564 U.S. 162, 165 (2011) (“The trust
obligations of the United States to the Indian tribes are established and governed by statute . . . .”); id. at
205 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“[C]ourts have similarly observed that . . . ‘the government has
longstanding and substantial trust obligations to Indians.’” (quoting Cobell v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1081,
1098 (D.C. Cir. 2001))).
80 See FLETCHER, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 28, § 5.6.
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the intention of Congress” to do so. 81 In Menominee Tribe of Indians v.
United States, the Court held that treaty rights to hunt and fish remained
intact even where Congress terminated its relationship to the tribe in a law
that was silent as to treaty rights, finding that “the intention to abrogate or
modify a treaty is not to be lightly imputed to the Congress.”82 The clear
statement rules originated, as Phil Frickey showed, in Worcester v. Georgia,
where the Court would not allow Indian treaties to be used “covertly” to
undermine tribal governance. 83 Frickey referred to the rule as “quasiconstitutional,” a reference to the heightened separation of powers impact on
treaty making. 84 To be sure, Congress has the power to abrogate Indian
treaties.85 But the Court is hesitant to find congressional treaty abrogation in
the absence of “explicit statutory language.”86
Related to the clear statement rules are the canons for construction of
Indian treaties. Since the Marshall Trilogy—three cases authored by Chief
Justice John Marshall that are foundational for federal Indian law 87 —the
Court has recognized that the United States frequently possessed an unfair
bargaining position relative to that of Indian nations. 88 For example, the
treaties were always negotiated and written in English. And sometimes the
United States imposed its will against Indian nations to force agreement to
treaties with bad terms for Indian people.89 Hence, the Court has always held
that ambiguous terms in Indian treaties are to be construed to the benefit of
Indians and tribes, treaty terms are to be interpreted as the Indians at the time
of the negotiation understood those terms, and the courts may look to
extraneous evidence of the historical context in which the treaties were
negotiated in support of the tribes’ interpretations.90
81

109 U.S. 556, 557, 572 (1883).
391 U.S. 404, 412–13 (1968) (quoting Pigeon River Co. v. Cox Co., 291 U.S. 138, 160 (1934)).
83 Frickey, supra note 3, at 412–17 (quoting Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 554).
84 See id. at 412, 415 & n.149.
85 See, e.g., Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 566 (1903) (“When . . . treaties were entered into
between the United States and a tribe of Indians it was never doubted that the power to abrogate existed
in Congress . . . .”).
86 United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 739 (1986) (quoting Washington v. Washington State Com.
Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658, 690 (1979)).
87 Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.)
1 (1831); Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515. For a critical analysis of the trilogy, see Matthew L.M. Fletcher,
The Iron Cold of the Marshall Trilogy, 82 N.D. L. REV. 627, 627–30 (2006).
88 FLETCHER, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 28, § 5.4.
89 See id. § 3.2 (2016) (“[T]he government did on occasion use military force to compel tribal leaders
to ‘consent’ to a removal treaty, or to physically compel removal.”).
90 See, e.g., Herrera v. Wyoming, 139 S. Ct. 1686, 1699 (2019) (describing the canons of
construction); Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 206 (1999) (same);
Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576–77 (1908) (looking to the historical context to determine that
Indians had rights to the waterways near their reservation).
82
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Indian law is federal law. 91 Congress makes federal policy, first,
foremost, and exclusively.92 In the modern era, congressional plenary power
is tempered by the rising political and economic power of Indian tribes.93 The
clear statement rules are default rules designed to allow Congress to run
Indian affairs without interference from states, private interests, and even the
judiciary.94 Despite these presumptions and rules in favor of Indian tribes, as
we will see, Canary textualists are unimpressed, rejecting these rules at will
on the grounds that they are not “mandatory.”95 In fact, the primary goal of
Canary Textualism, as explored in the next Section, is to enforce the
dependency of Indian tribes. This tool is so unfortunately permeated with the
language of racial inferiority of Indian people as to be illegitimate.
C. “Dependency” as the Language of the Canary Textualist
The “ought-to-be” thinking of Canary Textualism utilizes the language
of Indian and tribal “dependency” as the primary tool to enforce tribal
passivity and weakness. It is true that with dependency comes the federal
government’s duty of protection. 96 But throughout the history of federal
Indian law, the Supreme Court has warped the meaning of dependency by
insisting that dependency was justified by the assumed racial inferiority of
Indian people.97 Even though civil society has moved past that dark history,
Canary textualists rely heavily on that history in their methodology.
This language of dependency is important. There are two ways to
characterize the dependency of Indian tribes and consequently two very
different meanings of dependency. Chief Justice Marshall’s opinions in
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, which introduced the term “domestic
dependent nations,” 98 and Worcester v. Georgia established that tribal
91

FLETCHER, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 28, § 1.2.
Id. § 1.2.
93 E.g., Carole Goldberg & Duane Champagne, Ramona Redeemed? The Rise of Tribal Political
Power in California, 17 WICAZO SA REV. 43, 45 (2002) (“Today, California Indian tribes have greater
political access to and influence in state and federal governments than ever before.” (citing Ioana
Patringenaru, Tribes Come of Age, 30 CAL. J. 1, 8 (1999))).
94 Cf. FLETCHER, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 28, § 1.3 (“The clear statement rule is a defining
rule in federal Indian law. The clear statement rule is, simply put, that courts will not find a limitation of
tribal governance authority absent a clear statement by Congress to that effect.”).
95 Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 94 (2001).
96 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 551–56, 560–61 (1832), abrogated by McClanahan v.
Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973), as recognized in White Mountain Apache Tribe v.
Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980); see also United States v. Candelaria, 271 U.S. 432, 442 (1926)
(“Congress . . . was but continuing a policy which prior governments had deemed essential to the
protection of such Indians.”).
97 See, e.g., Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 568–69 (1883) (asserting the “savage” nature of
Indians to justify their “pupilage” under the federal government).
98 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
92
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dependency was intended to serve as a term of art akin to its usage in
international customary law.99 Marshall’s description of dependence in his
Cherokee Nation opinion—an opinion which only one other Justice joined—
was that Indian tribes “are in a state of pupilage. Their relation to the United
States resembles that of a ward to his guardian.”100 Dissenting, Justice Smith
Thompson, joined by Justice Joseph Story, argued that the dependence of
Indian tribes should be read in the context of the duty of protection, allowing
for the continued robust sovereignty of dependent tribes. 101 A year later,
Chief Justice Marshall roundly endorsed the Cherokee Nation dissenters’
understanding of the duty of protection in a 6–1 opinion, writing that “Indian
nations had always been considered as distinct, independent political
communities, retaining their original natural rights.”102 The Worcester Court
held that the existence of the “duty of protection” between the United States
and the tribe, a relationship between sovereigns, meant that tribes retained
the powers of self-government.103 It is this duty of protection from which the
default rules preserving tribal self-government originate.104
The other characterization, the language of guardianship or pupilage, is
the justification for the imposition of centuries of horrific abuses perpetrated
upon Indian people. This characterization justified the confiscation,
allotment, and sale of the lands “of an ignorant and dependent race.”105 This
characterization justified—and authorized—the Major Crimes Act’s
application to the lands of people “[d]ependent largely for their daily food,”
“[d]ependent for their political rights,” and “weak[] and helpless[].”106 Indian
people long have been the Supreme Court’s punching bag: “a simple,
uninformed people, ill-prepared to cope with the intelligence and greed of
other races” (describing Pueblo Indians); 107 “nomadic and savage” (other
99

31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561 (1832).
30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17. Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion was joined by Justice John McLean.
Rennard Strickland, The Tribal Struggle for Indian Sovereignty: The Story of the Cherokee Cases, in
INDIAN LAW STORIES, supra note 43, at 61, 71.
101 See 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 53 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
102 Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 536, 559, 563, 596.
103 See id. at 556.
104 Cf. Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 572 (1883) (“To give to the clauses in the treaty of 1868
and the agreement of 1877 effect, so as to uphold the jurisdiction exercised in this case, would be to
reverse in this instance the general policy of the government towards the Indians, as declared in many
statutes and treaties, and recognized in many decisions of this court, from the beginning to the present
time. To justify such a departure, in such a case, requires a clear expression of the intention of Congress,
and that we have not been able to find.” (emphasis added)).
105 Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903).
106 United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886). The Major Crimes Act is the section of the
Indian Appropriations Act implicated in Kagama. See S. Lee Martin, Indian Rights and the Constitutional
Implications of the Major Crimes Act, 52 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 109, 114 & n.34 (1976).
107 United States v. Candelaria, 271 U.S. 432, 442 (1926).
100
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Indians living in New Mexico);108 “ignorant and wild Indians” (the Pueblos
again);109 and “[i]mmorality and a general laxness in regard to their family
relations, together with . . . Pagan practices” (the Zunis).110 A list like this
would be much, much longer if the statements of the lower courts were
included.
Keep in mind that since the late 1960s and early 1970s, Congress and
the Executive Branch departed from the race-tinged dependency metaphor
that characterized federal Indian law and policy. 111 The policymaking
branches of government now consistently refer to the federal–tribal
relationship not as a guardianship, but as a trust relationship.112 In the last
half century or so, Congress and the Executive Branch have consistently
implemented the United States’ duty of protection to Indians and tribes in a
manner that favors tribal sovereignty.113
Canary textualists, on the other hand, will have none of it. Consider
Montana v. United States, in which the Supreme Court articulated a rule that
allows the Court to—at will—deviate from the default Indian law
interpretative rules. There, the Court held that an “exercise of tribal power
beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control
internal relations is inconsistent with the dependent status of the tribes.”114
Whether intentionally or not, Canary textualists equate dependency with
inferiority rooted not in the duty of protection, but in race. For Canary
textualists, tribal powers do not extend beyond what is consistent with their
conception of tribal dependency. Default interpretative rules, treaty terms,
congressionally announced policy, and even precedent must give way if the
Canary textualist has deemed the tribal power inconsistent with the
dependent status of Indian tribes.115 In applying this rule, the Court arrogates
to itself the status of policymaker. In these cases, it is the Court, not
108

Id.
United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 43 (1913).
110 Id. at 44.
111 FLETCHER, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 28, §§ 3.12–.15.
112 United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 564 U.S. 162, 192–93 (2011) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)
(“Indeed, ‘[n]early every piece of modern legislation dealing with Indian tribes contains a statement
reaffirming the trust relationship between tribes and the federal government.’” (quoting COHEN’S
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 5.04[4][a] (2005 ed.))).
113 FLETCHER, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 28, § 3.12.
114 450 U.S. 544, 564–67 (1981) (emphasis added).
115 See id. at 569 (Blackmun, J., dissenting in part) (“Only two years ago, this Court reaffirmed that
the terms of a treaty between the United States and an Indian tribe must be construed ‘in the sense in
which they would naturally be understood by the Indians.’ In holding today that the bed of the Big Horn
River passed to the State of Montana upon its admission to the Union, the Court disregards this settled
rule of statutory construction.” (citations omitted) (quoting Washington v. Wash. State Comm. Passenger
Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658, 676 (1979))).
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Congress, that decides which powers are inconsistent with the dependent
status of Indian tribes.
How do Canary textualists apply the dependency rule? In Montana, the
Crow Nation (backed by the federal government) argued that it possessed
civil regulatory jurisdiction over nonmember hunting and fishing on its
reservation, even on nonmember-owned land. The tribe and the federal
government pointed out that no act of Congress had divested tribal powers
over the reservation. The Court held instead that the power to regulate
nonmember hunting and fishing on nonmember land was inconsistent with
the dependent status of the tribe.116 The Court essentialized the Crow Nation
people as mere bison hunters who never had expressed much interest in fish
before.117 Similarly, in Strate v. A-1 Contractors, the Court held that the tribal
court of the Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation (now
known as the Mandan Hidatsa Arikara Nation) possessed no jurisdiction over
a tort claim brought by a nonmember reservation resident and her tribalmember family against a nonmember business.118 The Court emphasized that
the tribes were “strangers” to the parties and their dispute119 and that tribal
court jurisdiction was not critical to the tribal governance of the reservation,
which is all the power that a dependent nation was entitled. 120 The Court
made further reference to the state courthouse being closer to the scene of
the accident than the tribal court building.121 Finally, the Court acknowledged
an exception, whereby the tribe may retain jurisdiction over conduct that
impairs “the health or welfare of the tribe.”122 In declining to uphold such an
exception, the Court suggested that a single car accident that seriously
injured or killed a tribal member was not enough to justify tribal
jurisdiction,123 thereby raising the morbid question: How many Indians will
nonmembers have to kill or maim in order for the Court to allow tribal
jurisdiction?
Additionally, lurking in the background of these tribal jurisdiction cases
is the baseless worry, concern, and skepticism about tribes and nonmembers
rooted in assumptions of inferiority of Indians and tribes. Amici and
occasionally the nonmember parties make outrageous claims rooted in
116

Id. at 548–50, 564–65 (majority opinion).
Id. at 570 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority’s reliance on the factual premise
“that fish were not ‘a central part of the Crow diet’” (quoting United States v. Montana, 457 F. Supp. 599,
602 (D. Mont. 1978))).
118
520 U.S. 438, 442–43, 453 (1997).
119 See id. at 457.
120 Id. at 459.
121 Id. at 445 n.4.
122 Id. at 457–58 (quoting Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566 (1981)).
123 Id.
117
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anecdote about tribal judges, tribal courts, and tribal laws. That strategy
reached fruition in Nevada v. Hicks, when Justice David Souter wrote a
lengthy concurrence restating a wide variety of those claims about tribes.124
That concurrence’s worst crime is essentializing all tribal justice systems as
the same. Like tribes, tribal justice systems differ—no one tribal court is
exactly like another. Still, Justice Souter’s concurrence is a regular citation
in tribal jurisdiction cases 125 —and is often the centerpiece of anti-tribal
briefs.126
Perhaps it is not a perfect match, but Justice Scalia’s majority opinion
in Nevada v. Hicks, arguably the most important Indian law opinion he
authored, looks for all intents and purposes to be a maximal Canary textualist
opinion, designed to resolve a whole host of open questions in opposition to
tribal interests. Hicks involved a 28 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights action and
related tort claim against Nevada police officers brought by a tribal citizen
in a tribal court.127 The majority opinion delved deep into dependency talk,
reminding tribes again that non-necessary tribal powers are “inconsistent”
with their status as “dependent[s].”128 Justice Scalia noted that, as dependent
nations, tribal governments possessed no general powers to enforce federal
civil rights norms against state officials. As dependent nations, tribes had no
reason to believe that the Congress that enacted § 1983 (the Ku Klux Klan
Act) would have thought it was abrogating state sovereign immunity in tribal
courts.129 In response to the tribe’s claim that the intervention of state officers
on trust lands was an affront to core tribal authority, the majority asserted
that states have considerable freedom in enforcing outside interests on
reservation land. 130 The Court added that the general rule against tribal
jurisdiction over nonmembers on nonmember-owned land impliedly
extended to tribal lands, as well. 131 Justice Scalia took a case about the

124

533 U.S. 353, 383–85 (2001) (Souter, J., concurring) (emphasizing the inferiority of tribal courts).
See, e.g., Plains Com. Bank v. Long Fam. Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 331, 337, 339 (2008)
(referencing Souter’s concurrence as foundational for the nature of tribal justice); Dolgencorp, Inc. v.
Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians, 746 F.3d 167, 176 (5th Cir. 2014) (same), aff’d by an equally divided
Court sub nom. Dollar Gen. Corp. v. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians, 136 S. Ct. 2159 (mem.).
126 See Supplemental Brief of Respondents at 7–8, Poarch Band of Creek Indians v. Wilkes, 139 S.
Ct. 305 (2019) (No. 17-1175), 2019 WL 2370267, at *7–8; Brief for the Petitioners at 6, Dollar Gen.,
136 S. Ct. 2159 (No. 13-1496), 2015 WL 5169095, at *6; Petitioner Plains Commerce Bank’s Brief at
41–42, Plains Com. Bank, 554 U.S. 316 (No. 07-411), 2008 WL 449965, at *41–42.
127 533 U.S. at 355–57.
128 Id. at 359 (quoting Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981)).
129 Id. at 367–69 & n.8.
130 Id. at 361–62.
131 Id. at 360 (explaining that the Montana Court implied that its rule applies to both nonmemberowned land and tribal land). Justice Souter would have made that ruling explicit. Id. at 375–76 (Souter,
J., concurring).
125

984

116:963 (2022)

Muskrat Textualism

authority of tribal courts to entertain § 1983 claims, broadly endorsed state
criminal law enforcement authority, and rewrote the law on tribal powers
over nonmembers generally. The Hicks majority was so broad that even
though the Court ruled unanimously against tribal interests, 132 multiple
Justices wrote or joined separate opinions objecting against the enormous
breadth of the opinion. 133 Nearly two decades later, one can see that the
Supreme Court believed that tribes (and their Ninth Circuit enablers)134 had
gone egregiously too far in asserting their powers.
Canary textualists did not invent the weaponization of the dependency
metaphor to defeat the policy prerogatives of Congress and Indian tribes. It
is apparent that Canary textualists borrow heavily from older cases that
explicitly derogated Indians as inferior, all the while ignoring the dark
history of those cases, to upset federal and tribal interests.
Consider City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, a relatively minor
case that has the potential to devastate tribal interests in virtually any
context.135 The case involved an effort by the tribe to claim a tax immunity
on lands owned by the tribe in fee within the exterior boundaries of its
reservation.136 The tribe’s theory was that since only Congress can terminate
a reservation, and Congress had not done so, the tribe’s reacquisition of lands
in fee that had passed out of Indian ownership was enough to restore the tax
immunity. 137 The Court rejected the theory, relying on a different rule
providing that the lands protected by federal superintendency passed out of
Indian control, so the lands lost the tax immunity unless the federal
government restored the immunity. The Court expounded at length on the
disruption that private citizens and municipalities would suffer if tribes could
unilaterally restore the reservation status of their lands. The Court worried
about the impact on the local tax base, land use regulations, criminal

132

Id. at 354 (majority opinion).
Id. at 386 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (explaining that the opinion did not address certain
jurisdictional questions); id. at 387 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(expressing concern that the holding undermined tribal authority).
134 The Ninth Circuit upheld tribal jurisdiction on “the fact that respondent’s home is located on
tribe-owned land within the reservation.” Id. at 357 (majority opinion).
135 See generally Sarah Krakoff, City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York: A Regretful
Postscript to the Taxation Chapter in Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law, 41 TULSA L. REV. 5, 6
(2005) (arguing that this case may embolden further encroachment by state and local tax authorities);
Wenona T. Singel & Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Power, Authority, and Tribal Property, 41 TULSA L. REV.
21, 45–47 (2005) (arguing that this case and its progeny have been used to “dispossess Indian people and
communities of their lands”); Joseph William Singer, Indian Title: Unraveling the Racial Context of
Property Rights, or How to Stop Engaging in Conquest, 10 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 1, 43 (2017) (explaining
that the Second Circuit has broadly interpreted Sherrill to deny New York tribes’ land claims).
136 City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 213–14 (2005).
137 Brief for Respondents at 12–19, Sherrill, 544 U.S. 197 (No. 03–855).
133
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jurisdiction, and the rising powers of the tribe 138 —all without supporting
evidence.
The Court articulated a set of equitable defenses—laches, impossibility,
and acquiescence—that states and local governments could employ to
protect state interests.139 No party had made any of those arguments or asked
the Court to adopt those equitable defenses. Never mind that the original
alienation of the reservation lands had been illegal under a law on the books
since the very first Trade and Intercourse Act.140 Never mind that the Court
disregarded the disruption imposed on the tribes created by local government
interference. Never mind that the Court articulated a new rule that appeared
to be heavily fact-dependent in its application but would not allow a remand
to allow the parties to develop a factual record to address the rule (this is a
theme in Indian law141).
Until Sherrill, the Court abided by the rule that transactions made in
violation of the Act were void ab initio.142 In Sherrill, the Court enforced a
view of Indian tribes as dependent nations under the wardship of the federal
government, discarding the clear statement rules.
Montana, Strate, Hicks, and Sherrill exemplify Canary Textualism. But
the case that normalized—indeed, weaponized—Canary Textualism is their
predecessor, Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, discussed in the next Part.
II. OLIPHANT V. SUQUAMISH INDIAN TRIBE
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe is the paradigmatic Canary
textualist case, weaponizing the view that the Court’s role in Indian affairs
138

Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 214–21.
Id. at 217–20.
140 Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, § 4, 1 Stat. 137, 138 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 177).
141 The Court routinely announces new rules that no party could have known would eventually
control the outcome of a case, applies those rules to the record at hand—a record that could not have been
developed in light of those rules—and then declines to remand for reconsideration in light of those rules.
For example, in an adoption case, the Supreme Court rejected a motion from the biological Indian father
to stay the judgment. Birth Father v. Adoptive Couple, 570 U.S. 940, 940 (2013). The outcome was driven
by the Court’s recent interpretation of the Indian Child Welfare Act, which limited the rights of the
biological father. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 570 U.S. 637, 654 (2013); see also Carcieri v. Salazar,
555 U.S. 379, 395–96 (2009) (adopting representations made by the United States in brief opposing a
petition for certiorari as a reason for declining to remand after announcing an interpretation of the Indian
Reorganization Act); Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566 (1981) (applying a new rule that tribes
can only assert regulatory jurisdiction over nonmembers that imperiled the tribe’s welfare and ignoring
that the tribe never could have known prior to the announcement of the new rule that it had to show
imperilment of its welfare).
142 See County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 245 (1985); Ewert v. Bluejacket,
259 U.S. 129, 138 (1922); see also Black Hills Inst. of Geological Rsch. v. S.D. Sch. of Mines & Tech.,
12 F.3d 737, 741 (8th Cir. 1993) (emphasizing the restriction on alienating Indian trust land in violation
of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934).
139
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is—in Justice Scalia’s words—to “discern what the current state of affairs
ought to be.”143 There, the Court “implie[d]” a divesture of tribal powers to
prosecute non-Indians. 144 Through an extensive review of statements of
members of Congress and low-level officials in the Executive Branch, as
well as federal court dicta,145 the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit that had
faithfully applied the rule to not divest tribal powers by implication over a
dissent from then-Judge Anthony Kennedy.146
The Supreme Court agreed with Judge Kennedy and reversed the Ninth
Circuit, holding that no Indian tribe possessed criminal jurisdiction over nonIndians.147 In the absence of a clear expression of the intent of Congress to
divest Indian tribes of the power to prosecute non-Indians, the Court began
with a survey of federal materials and ended with an analysis of the Treaty
of Point Elliott. Ultimately, the Court concluded that there had always
existed among the three branches of government and all Indian tribes an
“unspoken assumption” that Indian tribes did not possess criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians.148 This is Canary Textualism writ large.
A. The Court’s History on Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction over Non-Indians
The Court led with a lengthy dissertation on the history of tribal court
jurisdiction over non-Indians, finding that, in the nineteenth century, “few
Indian tribes maintained any semblance of a formal court system”;149 in 1834,
“the Indian tribes [were] without laws,” save “two or three”;150 and that only
thirty-three tribes (or forty-five, depending on how the Court was counting)
asserted jurisdiction over non-Indians at the time the case was pending.151
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See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
See United States v. Wheeler, where the Court—sixteen days after issuing its opinion in
Oliphant—stated, “In sum, Indian tribes still possess those aspects of sovereignty not withdrawn by treaty
or statute, or by implication as a necessary result of their dependent status.” 435 U.S. 313, 313, 323
(1978) (emphasis added) (citing Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 191 (1978)).
145 Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 191–208.
146 Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1010 (9th Cir. 1976) (applying “the long-standing rule that
‘legislation affecting the Indians is to be construed in their interest’” (quoting United States v. Nice, 241
U.S. 591, 599 (1916))), rev’d sub nom. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978); id. at
1014–19 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“Unlike that majority, [Judge Kennedy] would not require an express
congressional withdrawal of jurisdiction.”).
147 Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 195.
148 Id. at 203, 206–08.
149 Id. at 197.
150 Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 23-474, at 91 (1834)).
151 Id. at 196 (“Of the 127 reservation court systems that currently exercise criminal jurisdiction in
the United States, 33 purport to extend that jurisdiction to non-Indians. Twelve other Indian tribes have
enacted ordinances which would permit the assumption of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.”
(footnote omitted)).
144
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The Court could find only one federal court decision addressing the
power of tribes to prosecute non-Indians, 152 Ex parte Kenyon, a case
involving the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma.153 There, the court ruled against
the Cherokee Nation’s assumption of jurisdiction over a non-Indian
offender. 154 On appeal in Oliphant, the Ninth Circuit found Kenyon
inapposite, pointed out that the crime was committed off-reservation—which
would have stripped the tribe of jurisdiction anyway—likely making the
broader statement about tribal powers dicta.155 The Court noted that a 1970
opinion of the Interior Solicitor (that was withdrawn after the Oliphant and
Belgarde district courts confirmed tribal jurisdiction 156 ) “reaffirmed” the
Kenyon judgment.157 The Court’s apparent conclusion from this history was
that the assertion of tribal criminal jurisdiction by modern-era tribes was a
“relatively new phenomenon.”158
The Court further implied that tribes also did not believe they possessed
this jurisdiction. The Court asserted that “[f]rom the earliest treaties with
these tribes, it was apparently assumed that the tribes did not have criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians absent a congressional statute or treaty
provision to that effect.”159 The Court referenced the 1830 Treaty with the
Choctaw Nation, in which the tribe “express[ed] a wish” that the United
States “grant” the tribe the power to punish non-Indians.160 The Court cited
two Attorney General opinions asserting that the Choctaw Nation did not
possess that power without Congressional authorization.161 The Court here
152

Id. at 199.
14 F. Cas. 353, 353 (C.C.W.D. Ark. 1878) (No. 7,720).
154 Id. at 355.
155 Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1011 (9th Cir. 1976), rev’d sub nom. Oliphant v. Suquamish
Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191.
156 See Bench Memorandum from Nancy Bregstein, Clerk to Justice Lewis Powell, to Justice Lewis
Powell, at 21 (Jan. 6, 1978) [hereinafter Bregstein Memorandum] (on file with journal).
157 Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 200–01 (citing Criminal Jurisdiction of Indian Tribes Over Non-Indians,
77 I.D. 113, 115 (Aug. 10, 1970)).
158 Id. at 196–97.
159 Id. at 197.
160 Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting A Treaty of Perpetual Friendship, Cession and Limits, U.S.Choctaw Nation, art. 4, Sept. 27, 1830, 7 Stat. 333, 333–34).
161 Id. at 199 (first citing 2 Op. Att’y Gen. 693 (1834); and then citing 7 Op. Att’y Gen. 175 (1855)).
The Court cited the 1834 opinion for the proposition that “tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians is,
inter alia, inconsistent with treaty provisions recognizing the sovereignty of the United States over the
territory assigned to the Indian nation and the dependence of the Indians on the United States.” Id. That
opinion concerned the Choctaw Nation’s death sentence ordered on an enslaved man where “a negro
woman, belonging to a white citizen of the United States, domiciled in the Choctaw country west of the
Mississippi, ha[d] been murdered by [the] negro man, belonging to another white citizen.” 2 Op. Att’y
Gen. at 693. As my colleague Professor Justin Simard has pointed out, “Courts routinely cite [slave] cases
without acknowledging that they may no longer be, in a formal sense, good law. More important, courts
153
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was essentializing Indian nations as the same, which is a bit of a logical
fallacy—simply because two things are similar in one respect does not mean
they necessarily are similar in all respects. The Choctaw Nation’s 1830 treaty
was a removal treaty in which the tribe agreed at figurative gunpoint to leave
their homelands in the American southeast for a completely different
territory in Oklahoma.162
Asking the United States for jurisdiction over new lands was not a
situation the Suquamish Tribe, which never faced removal, ever had to
consider. 163 Indeed, according to the tribe, the original treaty language
proposed but not approved would have stripped the tribe of criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians:
Citizens of the United States may safely pass through their reserve. . . . Injuries
committed by whites towards them not to be revenged, but on complaint being
made they shall be tried by the Laws of the United States and if convicted the
offenders punished. Injuries by Indians to whites to be in like manner
prosecuted and punished according to law.164

It would have been possible—preferable, in fact—for the Court to
conclude that the Choctaw Nation in 1830 and the Suquamish Tribe of 1855
negotiated their respective treaties in far different contexts. The Port
Madison Reservation was then and now located in the traditional homelands
of the Suquamish Tribe, and it would have made much less sense for the tribe
to ask the federal government for governance power over its own lands in
1855.165 The majority never addressed this claim, instead leaving its own

rarely consider the ways in which a case’s slave context makes it less persuasive authority.” Justin Simard,
Citing Slavery, 72 STAN. L. REV. 79, 82 (2020). The Attorney General’s opinion rested on the horrific
principle that since slaves were property of white men, and white men were not subject to tribal
jurisdiction under the terms of the treaty, the tribe could not prosecute the defendant:
It is, therefore, very certain that the white men who owned the negro slaves in question were not
amenable to the laws or courts of the Choctaw nation; and that, for offences against the person or
property of each other, or of the Choctaws, they could only be tried and punished under the laws
of the United States.
2 Op. Att. Gen. at 695.
162 See generally Arthur H. DeRosier, Jr., Andrew Jackson and Negotiations for the Removal of the
Choctaw Indians, 29 HISTORIAN 343, 356, 361 (1967) (elaborating on the consequences for the tribe if it
did not agree to the treaty).
163 History & Culture, SUQUAMISH TRIBE (2015), https://suquamish.nsn.us/home/about-us/historyculture/#tab-id-3 [https://perma.cc/NRS6-JXLD] (“The Port Madison Indian Reservation reserved in the
Treaty of Point Elliott and was intended primarily for the use of Suquamish and Duwamish peoples. Most
of the Suquamish agreed to move to the reservation, which was located within their own territory.”).
164 Brief for the Respondents at 42, Oliphant, 435 U.S. 191 (No. 76-5729), 1977 WL 189289, at *42.
165 For a discussion of Port Madison, see Frequently Asked Questions, SUQUAMISH TRIBE (2015)
https://suquamish.nsn.us/home/about-us/faqs/ [https://perma.cc/A2J9-G6HE].
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evidence—and the Court’s leaps of logic—to stand alone without additional
explanation.166
B. The Federal Statutory Background
The next stage of the Court’s analysis focused on Congress.167 Unlike
the opinions at every other stage in this litigation, the Supreme Court’s
opinion buried the statutory analysis in a narrative about the legislative
atmosphere affecting Indian affairs in the nineteenth century.168 The Court
first established the national policy behind the key statute in the case, the law
now known as the Indian Country Crimes Act, 169 “was with providing
effective protection for the Indians ‘from the violences of the lawless part of
our frontier inhabitants.’”170 Section five of the Trade and Intercourse Act of
1790 subjected “any citizen or inhabitant of the United States” to federal
criminal jurisdiction if they committed a crime against “peaceable and
friendly Indian or Indians.”171 That provision was silent as to tribal criminal
jurisdiction over those same criminals. Then “[i]n 1817, Congress . . .
extended federal enclave law to the Indian country,”172 but again the law was
silent as to tribal jurisdiction.
The Court’s survey of the history of congressional engagement with the
power of Indian tribes to prosecute non-Indians that followed the discussion
of the Indian Country Crimes Act is a lively narrative designed to cover for
the fact that Congress never divested tribes of the power to prosecute nonIndians. The Court opened with a discussion of the Western Territory bill, a
bill that never became law, and which was designed to apply only to tribes
in what is now Oklahoma.173 The purpose of the bill, should it have become
law, was to induce the removal of eastern Indian tribes with their own

166 Justice Powell’s clerk similarly noted the tribe’s treaty evidence as an afterthought but considered
the excluded language not helpful to determine the “contemporaneous understanding” of the treaty.
Bregstein Memorandum, supra note 156, at 29–30.
167 Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 201–03.
168 See id. This choice to avoid reliance on federal statutes could be explained by what appears to be
the firm understanding of the clerks that worked on the opinion that no federal statute stripped tribes of
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. See Bregstein Memorandum, supra note 156, at 22–23.
169 18 U.S.C. § 1152.
170 Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 201 (quoting George Washington, President of the United States, Seventh
Annual Address (Dec. 8, 1795) [hereinafter Seventh Annual Address], reprinted in 1 JAMES D.
RICHARDSON, A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1789–1897, at 181,
185 (Washington, Gov’t Printing Off. 1896)).
171 Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 34, § 5, 1 Stat. 138 (1790).
172 Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 201 (citing Act of Mar. 3, 1817, ch. 92, 3 Stat. 383 (1817) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1152)).
173 Id. at 201–03.
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territory and government.174 The Court quoted a portion of the legislative
history that described provisions for the immunization of federal officials
assigned to the territory from the jurisdiction of the territorial government:
Officers, and persons in the service of the United States, and persons required
to reside in the Indian country by treaty stipulations, must necessarily be placed
under the protection, and subject to the laws of the United States. To persons
merely travelling in the Indian country the same protection is extended. The
want of fixed laws, of competent tribunals of justice, which must for some time
continue in the Indian country, absolutely requires for the peace of both sides
that this protection should be extended.175

As a matter of Indian affairs policy, that choice makes sense. But what
of non-Indian settlers? The legislative history explained that those who
“voluntarily” moved to the territory would be subject to the plenary
jurisdiction of the territorial government: “As to those persons not required
to reside in the Indian country, who voluntarily go there to reside, they must
be considered as voluntarily submitting themselves to the laws of the
tribes.”176 The Court, in a footnote, attempted to explain away this language
by supposing that congressional policy behind such a provision was “to
discourage settlement on land that was reserved exclusively for the use of
the various Indian tribes.” 177 The legislative history offered no such
explanation. The legislation did authorize the governor of the territory and
the President to reprieve and pardon those convicted of a capital offence
under tribal law, respectively, and to restrict the power of more powerful
tribes over weaker tribes.178 The history concluded by noting that other than
these two restrictions, the United States would not interfere in the
government of the territory: “This [restriction designed to protect weaker
tribes], and the pardon of offenders in capital cases, are the only instances in
which the political power of the United States will interfere with that of the
tribes, or the confederation.”179 In this history of a bill that never became law,
involving tribes worlds away from the Suquamish Indian Tribe (the
Suquamish and the tribes of Oklahoma share little in terms of history and
culture), Congress did not seem overly concerned about tribal criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians. The Court’s narrative here lands with a dull
thud.

174
175
176
177
178
179

H.R. REP. NO. 23-474, at 14 (1834).
Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 202 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 23-474, at 18 (1834)).
H.R. REP. NO. 23-474, at 18 (1834).
Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 202 n.13.
H.R. REP. NO. 23-474, at 18–19 (1834).
Id. at 19–20.
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The Court then turned to congressional intent behind the 1854
amendments to the Trade and Intercourse Act and behind the Major Crimes
Act of 1885.180 The 1854 amendment barred federal prosecution of an Indian
for crimes that were subject to Indian jurisdiction.181 The Court inferred from
that provision that Congress must have assumed tribes did not possess the
power to prosecute non-Indians or else Congress would have adopted a
parallel provision to protect non-Indians.182 That logic does not follow, as
Congress might have decided to defer to tribal sovereignty on the
prosecution of Indians, while retaining a federal interest in prosecuting nonIndians.
Similarly, in the 1885 Act, the Court again inferred that Congress
assumed tribes could not prosecute non-Indians because the Act only
authorized federal felony criminal jurisdiction over Indians, improbably
leaving tribes with the power to prosecute non-Indian felonies.183 At first
glance, this interpretation appears to be a closer question, but several
problems remain with the Court’s assumption. First, despite what appears to
be the plain language of the Act (and two federal circuits cited by the
Court 184 ), the federal government’s jurisdiction over these crimes is not
exclusive in that tribes have always prosecuted lesser-included crimes
enumerated in the Act, as the Ninth Circuit recognized in 1995.185 Second,
the legislative history of the Act shows that Congress was far more
concerned with the tribe’s refusal to adequately punish Indian offenders with
whom the United States had no jurisdiction due to Ex parte Crow Dog,186 in
which the Court dismissed an indictment of an Indian for a crime against
another Indian for lack of a federal authorizing statute.187 Finally, the Crow
Dog Court articulated the proper rule for limiting tribal powers, the rule that
tribal powers should not be abrogated by implication, 188 exactly what the
majority opinion in Oliphant was doing.
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Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 203.
Id. at 203 (citing Act of March 27, 1854, ch. 26, § 3, 10 Stat. 269, 270 (codified as amended at
18 U.S.C. § 1152)).
182 See id. at 191.
183 Id. at 203.
184 Id. at 203–04 n.14 (citing Sam v. United States, 385 F.2d 213, 214 (10th Cir. 1967); Felicia v.
United States, 495 F.2d 353, 354 (8th Cir. 1974)).
185 Wetsit v. Stafne, 44 F.3d 823, 825–26 (9th Cir. 1995).
186 See S. DOC. NO. 48-105, at 2–3 (1st Sess. 1884) (expressing caution that the federal government
lacked jurisdiction to prosecute a murder case because both parties were Indian); 16 CONG. REC. 934
(1885) (same).
187 Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 570–72 (1883).
188 Id.
181
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Having exhausted its review of nineteenth-century congressional intent,
the Court turned to its own sparse precedents on the issue.
C. The Supreme Court’s Dictum in Mayfield
On the matter of congressional assumptions about tribal powers, the
Court relied on its own dictum in In re Mayfield, an 1891 decision dismissing
the indictment under the Indian Country Crimes Act of a Cherokee Nation
citizen for committing an act of adultery with a white woman. 189 The
Oliphant Court quoted Mayfield for the proposition that the “general object”
of federal Indian Country criminal statutes was to “reserve” federal
jurisdiction over all criminal matters in which a non-Indian is a party.190 But
that is a statement that appears to have been taken out of context. The
Mayfield Court was specifically referring to an 1890 act that governed
criminal jurisdiction in the “Indian Territory” (again, what is now
Oklahoma), not “Indian country” more generally. 191 Additionally, the
Mayfield Court’s description of general Indian affairs policy reversed the
policy as described by the Oliphant Court. The Mayfield Court asserted that
congressional policy prioritized the “safety of the white population” that
came into contact with Indians,192 while in the Oliphant opinion, the Court
stated that congressional policy was the opposite, to protect Indians from
“the lawless part of our frontier inhabitants.” 193 Tellingly, the Mayfield
Court’s assertion cited no authority, whereas the Oliphant statement was
supported by a statement of President Washington. The different statements
of policy matter a great deal—if Congress was interested in protecting nonIndians from Indians, then it would stand to reason that Congress would not
support tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, but if Congress was
interested in protecting Indians from non-Indians, then the Congress would
be more likely to support tribal powers over non-Indians, if nothing else, to
allow tribes to contribute to the effort to ensure law and order in Indian
Country. At bottom, the Mayfield Court’s dictum is most surely incorrect.
Moreover, the modern-era Supreme Court demands interrogation for
depending on policy statements from a nineteenth-century case addressing
the federal indictment of an Indian for adultery. The United States of the
1880s and 1890s was deeply involved in an abusive program to assimilate
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141 U.S. 107, 116 (1891).
Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 204 (quoting Mayfield, 141 U.S. at 116).
191 Mayfield, 141 U.S. at 115 (citing Act of May 2, 1890, ch. 182, § 30, 26 Stat. 81, 94 (1890)); see
also McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452, 2476 (2020) (“Originally, it seems criminal prosecutions in
the Indian Territory were split between tribal and federal courts.” (citing § 30, 26 Stat. at 94)).
192 Mayfield, 141 U.S. at 115–16.
193 435 U.S. at 201 (quoting Seventh Annual Address, supra note 170, at 185).
190
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Indian people by stripping them of their lands, languages, and cultures.194 In
a separate case tangentially involving the prosecution of an Indian in Oregon
for adultery, one federal district court even referred to an Indian reservation
as a “school.”195 The federal prosecution of adults for adultery long has been
anathema in the United States.196 Despite the fact that the Court dismissed
the indictment in Mayfield, segregationist-era dicta praising the federal
government’s paternalism should have been given no credence in Oliphant.
The Court then turned to twentieth-century statements of congressional
intent.
D. The 1960 Acts
For its final argument, the Court returned again to the statutory realm,
this time arriving in the twentieth century, pointing to the legislative history
of a pair of 1960 statutes that criminalized the destruction of reservation
signs197 and poaching on Indian lands.198 As the statutes do nothing more than
establish new federal crimes and are silent as to tribal powers, the Oliphant
Court again was forced to turn to the legislative record for support.199 The
report accompanying the legislation offers statements that directly support
the majority’s conclusion: first, “Indian tribal law is enforcible against
Indians only; not against non-Indians” and, second, “Non-Indians are not
subject to the jurisdiction of Indian courts and cannot be tried in Indian courts
on trespass charges.”200 The Oliphant Court included these statements in its
concluding remarks of its section on congressional powers,201 which are by
far the plainest statements in the Congressional Record on tribal powers, but
the history of how the Senate adopted this position is a comedy of errors.
The colloquies in 1958 between the representatives supporting the bill,
the federal government, the tribes’ attorneys, and the representatives on the
Judiciary Subcommittee suggest that not a single one of them knew of
authority that definitively answered any questions about the powers of Indian
tribes (as the Oliphant Court would later learn)—but that both the Executive
branch and tribal council had clear opinions about tribal powers.
See Rose Stremlau, “To Domesticate and Civilize Wild Indians”: Allotment and the Campaign
to Reform Indian Families, 1875–1887, 30 J. FAM. HIST. 265, 266 (2005).
195 United States v. Clapox, 35 F. 575, 577 (D. Or. 1888).
196 See generally Martin J. Siegel, For Better or For Worse: Adultery, Crime & the Constitution,
30 J. FAM. L. 45, 46–49 (1991) (summarizing the history of adultery criminal laws in the United States
through the American Law Institute’s removal of adultery from the Model Penal Code in 1955).
197 Pub. L. No. 86-634, § 1, 74 Stat. 469, 469 (1960) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1164).
198 See id. § 2 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1165).
199 435 U.S. at 204–06.
200 Id. at 205–06 (quoting S. REP. NO. 86-1686, at 2 (1960)).
201 Id. at 205–06.
194
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Representative Walt Horan of Washington State testified on behalf of the
bills, describing them incorrectly as statutes authorizing tribes to prosecute
trespassers202—implying jurisdiction over non-Indians. A representative of
the Department of the Interior Solicitor’s Office then asserted that tribes
cannot prosecute non-Indians “either in the Federal or in the state courts,”203
a statement that, while true, is irrelevant—tribes cannot prosecute criminals
in federal or state court any more than federal or state governments can
prosecute lawbreakers in tribal court. A member of the Subcommittee,
Representative Roland V. Libonati of Illinois, asked the Solicitor’s
representative about Representative Horan’s statement that tribes should be
able to prosecute non-Indians. 204 In response, the government official
corrected an assumption in Representative Libonati’s question, asserting that
tribes could not prosecute non-Indians for lack of jurisdiction. 205 Cyril
Brickfield, counsel to the Judiciary Committee, pressed the Interior
Solicitor’s representative for reasons why tribes could not prosecute nonIndians, and the representative responded by asserting that tribal powers
were “personal,” not territorial.206 That statement seemingly contradicted the
official’s statement a moment earlier when he acknowledged tribes have the
power to exclude non-Indians from their territories and to regulate those
within their territories. 207 The federal government has acknowledged the
power of tribes to exclude persons from their lands since at least 1821.208
Even the attorney for several tribes supporting the bills, Marvin Sonosky,
202 Bills to Amend Title 18 of the U.S. Code to Make It Unlawful to Destroy, Deface, or Remove
Certain Boundary Markers on Indian Reservations, and to Trespass on Indian Reservations to Hunt,
Fish, or Trap: Hearing on H.R. 8224 and H.R. 7240 Before the Third Subcom. of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 85th Cong., 3–4 (1958) [hereinafter 1958 Hearing] (statement of Rep. Horan) (“It has always
been assumed that it was unlawful to do that on an Indian reservation without explicit consent of the tribal
councils, and yet this measure is necessary, as I understand it, to enable to [sic] tribal councils to prosecute
those who trespass on the reservation.”); id. at 5 (“Also, it will give the Indians the authority and
somewhat of a privilege to take an unlawful trespasser to the courts and prosecute.”).
203 Id. at 14 (statement of Lewis A. Sigler, Interior Solicitor’s Office) (emphasis added).
204 Id. at 16 (statement of Rep. Libonati) (“There are some Congressmen who seem to think that they
should have the power to enforce these laws against these violators by the tribes themselves.”).
205 Id. (statement of Lewis A. Sigler, Interior Solicitor’s Office) (“There is no jurisdiction in the tribal
courts. You [sic] question indicated you assumed the tribal courts have jurisdiction.”).
206 Id. at 21 (statement of Cyril Brickfield) (“The Indian jurisdiction is primarily personal rather than
territorial. That is subject to many qualifications, but the best I can do in answering your question is that
the Indians do not have jurisdiction over an area of land and all people within that area.”).
207 Id. at 19–20 (statement of Lewis A. Sigler, Interior Solicitor’s Office) (“I think that there should
be no question about the authority of the owner of that property to exclude others or to permit them to
come on after paying a fee for that purpose. It is merely the right that goes with ownership of the land,
and these are Indian lands, and they are entitled to their fish and wildlife -- they are entitled to use their
fish and wildlife resources for their own benefit, and if anybody comes on their land, they can properly
be charged for it, in my judgment.”).
208 Powers of Indian Tribes, 55 Interior Dec. 14, 48 (1934) (citing 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 465, 466 (1821)).
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asserted that tribes possessed no powers over non-Indians: “Tribal law does
not touch this trespasser since it is enforceable against Indians only.”209 If
nothing else, this mid-twentieth-century exchange shows a severe deficiency
of understanding on all sides on the question of the scope of tribal powers.
As a practical matter, the bills seemed facially unworkable and the
justifications for the bills did not make much sense to the nonexperts in the
room. Representative Libonati questioned the practicality of extending
federal criminal jurisdiction over reservation trespass and poaching when the
tribal government could effectively do it themselves, 210 probably because
tribal officials could respond more quickly than federal officials, who likely
were hours away. Glen Wilkinson, another attorney representing several
tribes supporting the bill, strangely declined to address the question, and
instead pointed out that the bill did not contemplate the expansion of tribal
jurisdiction.211 Brickfield more directly asked about the efficiency of the bill,
wondering whether placing primary jurisdiction in the hands of the federal
government would be defeated by “delay[s].” 212 Representative Libonati
pressed Wilkinson on this point further, wondering why the bill should not
just place “exclusive[]” jurisdiction in the tribal court.213 Wilkinson (recall
he was counsel to Indian tribes) asserted that such a bill would subject nonIndians to tribal jurisdiction when they are already subject to state
jurisdiction,214 a non sequitur given that the dual sovereignty exception to
double jeopardy had long been established.215 In short, none of the witnesses
209

1958 Hearing, supra note 202, at 30 (statement of Marvin J. Sonosky).
Id. at 48 (statement of Rep. Libonati) (“[T]he tribal court could sit as a court just to determine
whether the defendant was directly or indirectly connected with the crime, or misdemeanor, not to pass
upon the merits, if you follow me.”).
211 Id. (statement of Glen Wilkinson) (“Mr. Chairman, again all I can say is that the jurisdiction of
the tribal courts would not be enlarged, and this would be purely a matter for determination by the Federal
courts; so I can see no room for discrimination with respect to any accused.”).
212 Id. at 49 (statement of Cyril Brickfield) (“Would there be a delay, or how much delay would there
be between his apprehension or arrest and being brought as a preliminary matter before some Federal
officer? As I understand it, it is conceivable that there would be instances where you would have great
distances between the point of arrest and the Federal officer who could sit preliminarily or to dispose of
the case for that matter.”).
213 Id. at 50 (statement of Rep. Libonati) (“I do not understand why you did not place jurisdiction in
the tribal court exclusively, or at least a review hearing for a tribal court to determine if a crime was
actually committed; and in line with the statements of counsel for the committee, determine whether or
not a person is an innocent trespasser or one intent on violating or conspiring against the laws relative to
fishing or hunting.”).
214 Id. at 50–51 (statement of Glen Wilkinson) (“Mr. Chairman, I feel that that approach would get
us into very serious constitutional questions, because a non-Indian citizen of a state in which a reservation
is located is subject to the jurisdiction of that state. If we attempt to enlarge tribal court jurisdiction to that
point, I fear I would have valid objection.”).
215 Cf. Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1966–67 (2019) (discussing the earliest dual
sovereignty doctrine cases, which date back to before the Civil War).
210
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knew the answer to the question of tribal powers, but reiterated unsupported
assumptions. And ironically, the Court could point to congressional
authorities confirming that at least federal government and tribal attorneys
assumed tribes had no criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. Yet, like the
Oliphant Court two decades later, they knew of no reasoned basis for
reaching that conclusion.
This comedy of errors is the Court’s best evidence that some
government officials did indeed share an assumption that tribes did not
possess the power to prosecute non-Indians.
E. The Treaty of Point Elliott
The second part of the Oliphant opinion, which purported to address
the Treaty of Point Elliott that established the Port Madison Reservation,216
offered little discussion of the treaty. Instead, it focused on developing a
narrative of tribal dependency—in other words, the inferiority of Indian
people to non-Indian people.
The Court first highlighted Article IX of the treaty, which provides that
the signatory tribes “acknowledge their dependence on the government of
the United States.”217 The Court looked in the Marshall Trilogy for a meaning
of “dependence” and settled on language that suggested tribes relied on the
United States for physical protection from “lawless and injurious intrusions
into their country.” 218 The Court determined that dependence means that
“Indian tribes are prohibited from exercising both those powers of
autonomous states that are expressly terminated by Congress and those
powers ‘inconsistent with their status.’”219 Hence, here, the Court suggested
that there could be tribal powers that Congress has not explicitly terminated
or modified that may still be divested from tribes by virtue of the dependency
of tribes.

216

Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 206–11 (1978).
Id. at 207 (quoting Treaty Between the United States and the Dwámish, Suquámish, and Other
Allied and Subordinate Tribes of Indians in Washington Territory, art. IX, Jan. 22, 1855, 12 Stat. 927,
929).
218 Id. (quoting Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 555 (1832)).
219 Id. at 208 (quoting Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1009 (9th Cir. 1976)).
217
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The Oliphant majority referenced the dependence of Indian tribes ten
times,220 and the power of tribal self-government once.221 Recall that the Port
Madison reservation was and is part of the homeland of the Suquamish
Indian Tribe, not the other way around.
*

*

*

As should be clear by now, the Oliphant Court did not credit the
understanding of dependence that allowed for robust tribal self-government.
For the Oliphant majority, it is the dependence of Indian tribes that divests
them of the power of criminal prosecution of non-Indians. 222 The Court
quoted Johnson v. M’Intosh for this principle: “[T]heir rights to complete
sovereignty, as independent nations, [are] necessarily diminished.” 223
Johnson, of course, is the first case in the Marshall Trilogy, a case in which
the Court decided that Indian nations did not possess the power to alienate
their original title to any nation other than the discovering nation, reasoning
that the “Indians inhabiting this country were fierce savages, whose
occupation was war . . . and who could not be governed as a distinct
society, . . . and [who exposed European settlers] and their families to the
perpetual hazard of being massacred.”224 These dependent Indians are the
Indians that the Oliphant Court worried about when contemplating tribal
jurisdiction over non-Indians.
Perhaps the federal treaty negotiators believed in 1855 that the
Suquamish Tribe and the few dozen other tribes that signed and agreed to
similar treaties 225 —the Stevens treaties 226 —were fierce savages, and that
Article IX placed the tribes into a wardship, or a state of pupilage. Not so. In
fact, the complete opposite was true, as the Supreme Court in 1978 knew
fully well. Judge Boldt’s famed 1974 decision in United States v.

220 Id. at 196 (Oliphant v. Schlie); id. at 199 (1834 Attorney General opinion); id. at 204 (Ex parte
Mayfield); id. at 206 n.16 (Article IX of the 1855 Treaty); id. at 207 (Article IX of the 1855 Treaty); id.
(Worcester); id. (1855 Treaty again); id. at 208 (Cherokee Nation v. Georgia); id. at 208 n.17
(McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm’n); id. at 209 (Johnson v. M’Intosh, for the proposition that
tribes are no longer “independent”).
221 See id. at 205 n.15 (referencing the 1977 American Indian Policy Review Commission that
acknowledged inherent tribal powers). A few days after Oliphant, the Court confirmed that Indian tribes
possessed robust inherent powers. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322–23 (1978).
222 435 U.S. at 209–10.
223 Id. at 209 (quoting Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 574 (1823)).
224 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 590.
225 History & Culture, supra note 163.
226 Kent Richards, The Stevens Treaties of 1854–1855, 106 OR. HIST. Q. 342, 342–47 (2005).
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Washington had already established that tribes in what is now Washington
State had been self-governing, civilized tribes in 1855 and ever since.227
It would have been reasonable—and compelled by the canons of
construing Indian treaties—for the Oliphant Court to interpret the silence of
the Treaty of Point Elliott on the question of tribal criminal jurisdiction over
non-Indians as evidence of retained tribal jurisdiction. That interpretation,
however, would have allowed modern-day Indian tribes to exercise
jurisdiction over white men like Mark David Oliphant, and that the Supreme
Court seemingly could not abide—as a matter of Canary Textualism.
Decades have passed since the Court delivered the Oliphant decision.
The Court seems to be split on whether to stay on that road. The next Part
details a superior theory.
III. MUSKRAT TEXTUALISM
We have reached a point in American legal history where textualism is
the dominant interpretive theory in public law. But we have also reached a
point where textualism is broad enough that fierce textualists can reach
opposite outcomes in analyzing the same texts.228 In federal Indian law, that
divide is as stark as anywhere in public law. This Part details the normatively
superior version of textualism in federal Indian law, Muskrat Textualism.
A. What Is Muskrat Textualism?
Muskrat Textualism is a metaphor that comes from the aadizookaan
(sacred stories) of the Anishinaabeg. 229 In one of these stories, the lowly
muskrat helps rebuild the world after the great flood. While the stronger
animals and the trickster god Nanaboozhoo floated on the water without
hope, the humble muskrat dove beneath the waters, swimming the farthest
down to reach the ground and return with a single pawful of dirt. With this
384 F. Supp. 312, 339–40, 359–82 (W.D. Wash. 1974), aff’d, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975).
See, e.g., Yellen v. Confederated Tribes of the Chehalis Reservation, 141 S. Ct. 2434, 2452 (2021)
(holding 6–3 that the Alaska Native Corporations are “recognized governing bod[ies]” under the CARES
Act); Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1736, 1753–54 (2020) (holding 6–3 that the Title VII
prohibition on discrimination “because of” sex protects LGTBTQ+ persons). The commentators on the
Strict Scrutiny podcast have helpfully critiqued the Court’s textualism in Yellen, which led to a 6–3 split
Court for entirely unsatisfying reasons. Comrade Thomas, STRICT SCRUTINY, at 36:30 (June 25, 2021),
https://strict-scrutiny.simplecast.com/episodes/comrade-thomas-_qOlsSDF
[https://perma.cc/U8JPWWY5]. Professor Kate Shaw pointed out that the Court’s divisions in textualist cases might be attributed
to “shadow decision points, . . . . [p]oints at which the court decides what text to emphasize.” Id. at 48:00.
I made a similar point in Textualism’s Gaze, where I argued textualists privilege texts depending on the
outcome they wish to reach. Fletcher, Textualism’s Gaze, supra note 55, at 112 (“The narrow focus of
the textualist’s gaze also warps how Indian law matters are decided.”).
229 One version of the muskrat’s role in the Anishinaabe creation story is reproduced in FLETCHER,
THE GHOST ROAD, supra note 13, at 3.
227
228
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crucial contribution from the muskrat, Nanaboozhoo used the dirt to
magically recreate the world. The muskrat is the symbol of the humility,
courage, and thoughtfulness that guided the Anishinaabeg back from near
extinction. Tribes should no longer be viewed as helpless birds; they should
be viewed as courageous muskrats.
Muskrat Textualism is a form of judicial minimalism applied in the
context of federal Indian law. Like the meek animal that courageously acted
to allow the trickster god to save creation, Indian tribes innovate and
proactively make their own choices that beneficially impact society.
Therefore, Muskrat textualists do not view Indians as helpless canaries;
Muskrat textualists view Indians and tribes as active participants in matters
of Indian Country governance. These judges invoke federal plenary power
in Indian affairs to create space to allow tribes, the federal government, and
state and local governments to negotiate away disputes and confusion over
reservation governance.230 These judges defer to acts of Congress and federal
regulations governing Indian affairs, leaving policy preferences for or
against tribal, state, or federal interests to the side.231 Muskrat textualists are
faithful to the text, when there is one, and defer to the default interpretative
rules, such as the clear statement rules, when there is no controlling text.232
The added benefit of Muskrat Textualism is that it restores a significant
amount of order to the confusion that has permeated Indian law since the rise
of Canary Textualism.
Justice Gorsuch is the leading Muskrat textualist on the Roberts Court.
Justice Gorsuch has not been a member of the Supreme Court for long, but
it is hard to believe this Justice would ever have (or will ever have) authored
a document (even an internal memo never intended to be illuminated by the
light of the public eye) like Scalia’s Duro memo. Gorsuch’s Indian record is
already extensive. His opinions in Upper Skagit Indian Tribe v. Lundgren,233
Washington State Department of Licensing v. Cougar Den,234 and, finally,

230 See, e.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 72 (1978) (“But unless and until Congress
makes clear its intention to permit the additional intrusion on tribal sovereignty that adjudication of such
actions in a federal forum would represent, we are constrained to find that [25 U.S.C.] § 1302 does not
impliedly authorize actions for declaratory or injunctive relief against either the tribe or its officers.”).
231 See, e.g., Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 555 (1974) (“As long as the special treatment can be
tied rationally to the fulfillment of Congress’ unique obligation toward the Indians, such legislative
judgments will not be disturbed. Here, where the preference is reasonable and rationally designed to
further Indian self-government, we cannot say that Congress’ classification violates due process.”).
232 See, e.g., Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 790 (2014) (“Although Congress
has plenary authority over tribes, courts will not lightly assume that Congress in fact intends to undermine
Indian self-government.”).
233 138 S. Ct. 1649 (2018).
234 139 S. Ct. 1000, 1016 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
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McGirt v. Oklahoma,235 are examples of a textualism we did not see from
Justice Scalia and other textualists.
Justice Gorsuch’s Muskrat Textualism was already on display before
he authored McGirt v. Oklahoma. In Upper Skagit, he declined to intervene
in a legal question of first impression, preferring to let the issue percolate in
the lower courts. There, the Court addressed whether the tribe possessed
sovereign immunity from quiet title actions involving tribe-owned fee land.
Lower courts had split on the question, both lines of cases resting on an
earlier Supreme Court decision, County of Yakima v. Yakima Indian
Nation.236 The Skagit majority merely held that Yakima did not control the
outcome, a position that the party suing the tribe had already conceded in its
merits brief.237 At the recommendation of the United States, the Lundgrens
changed their position at the merits stage to argue, instead of relying on
Yakima, that the Court should hold that the immovable property exception to
sovereign immunity applied to Indian tribes. The Court remanded back to
the lower court to address this question on first instance, with a total of seven
Justices agreeing on the remand.238
Unlike his four conservative brethren, Justice Gorsuch declined to
address the merits of the immovable property exception in Upper Skagit. The
Chief Justice, writing a concurrence joined by Justice Kennedy, claimed that
tribal immunity in these types of cases is “intolerable” and strongly
recommended on policy grounds that courts apply the exception.239 Justice
Thomas, writing a dissent joined by Justice Alito, expounded at length on
the origins and the benefits of the exception.240 Of course, the immovable
property exception originated as a response to foreign princes owning land
and asserting sovereign authority over the land of another sovereign. 241
Whether the doctrine should apply to Indian tribes is very much a policy
question, one Congress is usually deemed the most competent to address.
Four Justices had already made their policy choice. But like a faithful

235

140 S. Ct. 2452 (2020).
Upper Skagit, 138 S. Ct. at 1651–52.
237 Id. at 1653–54.
238 Id. at 1651, 1654–55 (justifying a remand); id. at 1655–56 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (joining
majority decision to remand). Since the Court’s remand decision, some courts have addressed the
immovable property exception to sovereign immunity; each has determined that the exception does not
apply to tribes. See Seneca County v. Cayuga Indian Nation, 978 F.3d 829, 832 (2d Cir. 2020), cert.
denied, 141 S. Ct. 2722 (2021); Self v. Cher-Ae Heights Indian Cmty., 60 Cal. App. 5th 209, 212 (2021),
cert. petition filed, No. 21-477 (U.S. Sept. 27).
239 Upper Skagit, 138 S. Ct. at 1655 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
240 Id. at 1656–63 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
241 Id. at 1657–58.
236
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Muskrat textualist, Justice Gorsuch humbly pushed that policy decision
down the road.242
In Cougar Den, Gorsuch addressed a claimed Indian tax immunity with
deference toward the value (or lack thereof) the tribe received from the
United States in its treaty. There, a split Court held that the 1855 Treaty with
the Yakamas243 (now known as the Yakama Nation) either preempted a state
motor fuels tax or impliedly immunized Indians from the tax through a right
to travel the highways.244 Four dissenters argued that no such preemption or
immunity existed.245 Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence, joined only by Justice
Ginsburg, provided the argument favoring an implied treaty right to a tax
immunity. Gorsuch wrote that the treaty firmly established that Indians had
negotiated for the right to travel unencumbered on the highways. 246
Following a lengthy road of precedent involving the interpretation of Indian
treaties, Gorsuch rejected the state’s position that the treaty merely allowed
Indians to travel the same as all other people247 (which of course would have
rendered the right to travel language in the treaty superfluous). The rest of
the Court debated the preemptive value of the federal, state, and tribal
interests. 248 Preemption analysis, which in Indian law is a balancing test
between competing federal, state, and tribal taxation and regulatory interests,
is inherently a policy debate.249 Gorsuch, even though joined by only one
other, refused to engage in that policy debate. Instead, foreshadowing his
opinion in McGirt, Gorsuch pointed out that the value of the lands ceded by
the Yakama Nation far exceeded the giveaways presented by the modern
state.250

242 It may already be that the Court has decided to leave well enough alone on this question, having
declined the review of a Second Circuit decision rejecting the immovable property exception in the 2020
Term. See supra note 238.
243 Treaty Between the United States and the Yakama Nation of Indians, June 9, 1855, 12 Stat. 951.
244 Wash. State Dep’t of Licensing v. Cougar Den, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 1000, 1011, 1017 (2018).
245 Id. at 1021–26 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
246 Id. at 1016–17 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
247 Id. at 1017–18.
248 Id. at 1013 (majority opinion) (“[T]o impose a tax upon traveling with certain goods burdens that
travel. And the right to travel on the public highways without such burdens is, as we have said, just what
the treaty protects. Therefore, our precedents tell us that the tax must be pre-empted.”); id. at 1026
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“In the meantime, do not assume today’s decision is good news for tribal
members across the country. Application of state safety regulations, for example, could prevent Indians
from hunting and fishing in their traditional or preferred manner, or in particular ‘usual and accustomed
places.’”).
249 See, e.g., California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 203, 209 (1987) (“The
shorthand test is whether the conduct at issue violates the State’s public policy.”).
250 Cougar Den, 139 S. Ct. at 1018 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
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Justice Gorsuch’s opinion in McGirt is perhaps the best example of
Muskrat Textualism in many decades, perhaps ever. We turn now to that
case.
B. McGirt v. Oklahoma
Observers claimed, among other things, that McGirt v. Oklahoma is a
“landmark” decision with “ramifications for the Creek Nation, Oklahoma,
and federal Indian law.”251 It is a “historic” win for tribal interests.252 The case
involved an area of federal Indian law—reservation boundaries
diminishment—that tribal advocates usually expect tribes to lose because of
Canary Textualism.253
1. The Law of Reservation Boundaries Diminishment
The general rule is, again, that only Congress can terminate a
reservation or modify reservation boundaries. Despite the clarity of the rule,
the Court’s cases are a complex jumble.254 It is fair to say that Congress rarely
legislated clear intent to terminate or modify reservation boundaries without
tribal agreement. The impact of federal legislation, however—and the
bureaucratic implantation of these laws—often was to allow crowds of nonIndians to enter reservations en masse, putting enormous pressure on the
Court many decades later to ratify the facts on the ground.255 Moreover, these
251

Allison Barnwell, McGirt v. Oklahoma, 0 PUB. LAND & RES. L. REV. 1, 6 (2020).
Julian Brave NoiseCat, The McGirt Case Is a Historic Win for Tribes, ATLANTIC (July 12, 2020),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/07/mcgirt-case-historic-win-tribes/614071/
[https://
perma.cc/7J9W-NM6S].
253 See, e.g., Charlene Koski, Comment, The Legacy of Solem v. Bartlett: How Courts Have Used
Demographics to Bypass Congress and Erode the Basic Principles of Indian Law, 84 WASH. L. REV.
723, 724 (2009) (explaining that courts’ consideration of the reservation’s demographics overwhelmingly
supports diminishment).
254 See, e.g., Marc Slonim, Indian Country, Indian Reservations, and the Importance of History in
Indian Law, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 517, 519–20 (2009) (summarizing the extensive litigation that resulted
from the definition of “Indian country” in a federal criminal statute).
255 See Randall Akee, Land Titles and Dispossession: Allotment on American Indian Reservations,
3 J. ECON., RACE, & POL’Y 123, 125 (2020) (explaining that, under the Dawes Act, “[f]or reservations
that were larger than the total assignment of acreage to the total number of heads of households, the extra
land was deemed ‘surplus’ and sold to non-Indians”); see also, e.g., Ready for Indian Land Rush: Five
Hundred Reach Bonesteel, S. D., on Special Train, DAILY TIMES, Jul. 8, 1904, at 6 (reporting that one
“special train” arrived and one was en route “for the opening of the Rosebud Indian reservation”);
“Sooners” Crowd Reservation Already: Daring Prospectors Cross the Line and Locate Claims.,
EVENING BEE, Jul. 3, 1907, at 7 (recounting reports “that ‘sooners’ are rapidly rushing over the lines into
the Pyramid Lake Indian Reservation”). The Court has often referred to demographic information when
it is about to rule against tribal interests. E.g., Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 193 n.1
(1978) (“Residing on the reservation is an estimated population of approximately 2928 non-Indians living
in 976 dwelling units. There lives on the reservation approximately 50 members of the Suquamish Indian
Tribe.”); DeCoteau v. Dist. Ct., 420 U.S. 425, 428 (1975) (“Within the 1867 boundaries, there reside
252

1003

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

reservation boundaries cases typically involved efforts by convicted
criminals to vacate jail terms on jurisdictional grounds.
The leading case, at least until McGirt, was Solem v. Bartlett.256 That
case involved a tribal member’s prosecution by the State of South Dakota
for a crime committed on the Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation. 257 The
Court drew from its experience in earlier reservation boundaries cases and
consolidated its learning into one statement of the law: “The first and
governing principle is that only Congress can divest a reservation of its land
and diminish its boundaries.” 258 Reservation diminishment “will not be
lightly inferred.” 259 Congress must “clearly evince an ‘intent . . . to
change . . . boundaries’ before diminishment will be found.” 260 If the
congressional act makes “[e]xplicit reference to cession or other language
evidencing the present and total surrender of all tribal interests,” and when
the “cession is buttressed by an unconditional commitment from Congress
to compensate the Indian tribe for its opened land, there is an almost
insurmountable presumption that Congress meant for the tribe’s reservation
to be diminished.”261 Ultimately, the Court concluded that Congress did not
terminate the reservation, failing to find the clear statement of intent.262
But the seeds for Canary textualist mischief were laid in the Solem
opinion, as the Court added that “explicit language of cession and
unconditional compensation are not prerequisites for a finding of
diminishment.”263 The Court would also look to subsequent treatment of the
lands in later enactments “[t]o a lesser extent”: “Congress’ own treatment of
the affected areas, particularly in the years immediately following the
opening, has some evidentiary value, as does the manner in which the Bureau
of Indian Affairs and local judicial authorities dealt with unallotted open
lands.”264 Finally, the Court stated it would look at the “pragmatic” story of
an Indian reservation as well, in particular the demographics of the
reservation: “Where non-Indian settlers flooded into the opened portion of a
reservation and the area has long since lost its Indian character, we have

about 3,000 tribal members and 30,000 non-Indians.”); cf. FLETCHER, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note
28, § 7.2 (discussing reservation boundaries litigation).
256 465 U.S. 463 (1984); FLETCHER, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 28, § 7.2.
257 Solem, 465 U.S. at 465.
258 Id. at 470.
259
Id.
260 Id. (quoting Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 615 (1977)).
261 Id. at 470–71 (citing DeCoteau v. Dist. Ct., 420 U.S. 425, 447–48 (1975)).
262 Id. at 475–76.
263 Id. at 471.
264 Id.
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acknowledged that de facto, if not de jure, diminishment may have
occurred.”265
In two later reservation boundaries cases, the Court relied on the two
nonstatutory factors. In Hagen v. Utah, the Court found reservation
diminishment where the demographics of the reservation supported the
narrative of diminishment despite contravening congressional records. 266
Similarly, in South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, the Court found
diminishment with at least some reliance on reservation demographics.267
But in Nebraska v. Parker, the Court focused its attention on the
statutes, “[t]he most probative evidence of diminishment.” 268 The Court
found insufficient evidence of diminishment and moved on to the subsequent
history of the reservation and the demographics.269 Despite the fact that “the
[t]ribe was almost entirely absent from the disputed territory for more than
120 years,”270 the Court refused to infer from that history the congressional
intent to diminish the reservation.271 The decision was unanimous. A victory
for Muskrat Textualism? Perhaps.272
2. The McGirt Majority
In McGirt v. Oklahoma, the Supreme Court held that the reservation
boundaries of the Creek Nation had never been disestablished by Congress,
and so they remained extant. 273 Because the Creek Reservation remained
extant, all of the lands within the reservation boundaries are considered
“Indian country” under federal law.274 State governments such as Oklahoma
do not possess criminal jurisdiction over Indians within Indian Country
without authorization from Congress. 275 Therefore, the state’s prosecution
and conviction of the respondent, Jimcy McGirt, a Seminole Nation member
who had committed a crime in Creek Indian Country, was invalid.276

265

Id.
510 U.S. 399, 411–21 (1994).
267 522 U.S. 329, 333, 351, 356–57 (1998).
268 136 S. Ct. 1072, 1079–80 (2016) (quoting Hagen, 510 U.S. at 411).
269 Id. at 1079–81.
270 Id. at 1081.
271 Id. at 1080–82.
272 The Court did leave open the possibility that tribal powers over portions of its undiminished
reservation may be subject to the defenses of “laches and acquiescence,” potentially undermining the
tribe’s victory on the reservation boundaries issue. Id. at 1076, 1082 (citing City of Sherrill v. Oneida
Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 217–21 (2005)).
273 140 S. Ct. 2452, 2464 (2020).
274 Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1151(a)).
275 See id. at 2459–60.
276 Id. at 2459, 2478.
266
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The Supreme Court’s rule on whether an Indian reservation’s
boundaries remain extant was (and is) whether Congress terminated or
altered those boundaries. 277 The Court also held that it will not find a
reservation diminished or disestablished unless Congress has made clear its
intent to do so.278 At the risk of reductionism, the McGirt Court applied a
simple syllogism: First, the Court found that various treaties with the Creek
Nation—now the Muscogee (Creek) Nation—and the United States had
established and altered reservation boundaries.279 Next, the Court found no
acts of Congress explicitly terminating the reservation. 280 As a result, the
reservation remained. Muskrat Textualism is usually far less complicated
than Canary Textualism.
a. The creation of the reservation
Highlighting “what should be obvious,” the Court pointed to two
treaties in reaching its conclusion that the United States and the Creek Nation
agreed to establish a reservation.281 The first treaty, from 1832, involved a
bargained-for exchange—in exchange for the Creek lands east of the
Mississippi River, the United States guaranteed lands west of the
Mississippi.282 The second treaty, from 1833, “settled on boundary lines for
a new and ‘permanent home to the whole Creek nation,’ located in what is
now Oklahoma.”283
The Court couched the creation of the reservation in the terms of a
bargained-for exchange. The United States offered the Creek Nation a deal—
move to the western territories and receive that permanent home.284 In 1852,
the United States issued a fee patent to the Creek Reservation.285 In 1856, the
United States promised that “no portion” of the reservation “shall ever be
embraced or included within, or annexed to, any Territory or State.”286
b. Reservation disestablishment
The next and final step in determining whether an Indian reservation
remains extant is to determine whether Congress has ever acted to terminate

277

Id. at 2462.
Id. (“Nor will this Court lightly infer such a breach once Congress has established a reservation.”).
279 Id. at 2460–62.
280 Id. at 2462–68.
281 Id. at 2460.
282 Id. at 2459 (citing Treaty with the Creeks, Creek Nation-U.S., arts. I, XIV, Mar. 24, 1832, 7 Stat.
366, 366, 368).
283 Id. (quoting Treaty with the Creeks, pmbl., 7 Stat. at 417–18).
284 Id. at 2460–61.
285 Id. at 2461.
286 Id. (quoting Treaty with Creeks and Seminoles, art. IV, Aug. 7, 1856, 11 Stat. 699, 700).
278

1006

116:963 (2022)

Muskrat Textualism

or disestablish the reservation.287 Quoting the most cited case on the subject,
Solem v. Bartlett, the McGirt Court reminded Oklahoma of the controlling
law on the subject: “Only Congress can divest a reservation of its land and
diminish its boundaries.”288 Moreover, if Congress does act to terminate a
reservation, it must make its intent to do so clear: “Disestablishment has
‘never required any particular form of words.’ But it does require that
Congress clearly express its intent to do so, ‘commonly with an explicit
reference to cession or other language evidencing the present and total
surrender of all tribal interests.’”289
The McGirt Court applied these rules faithfully and held that Congress
never terminated the reservation.290 The majority did so over dozens of pages
of historical evidence, inferences based on the legislative text, and the
multitude of policy claims by the state and others, but the Court’s core focus
of its analysis was on the legislative text.
The State argued that the allotment of the Creek Reservation by
Congress terminated the reservation. 291 Allotment—and an accompanying
surplus land act—has terminated several reservations, 292 but many other
reservations have survived allotment.293 Allotment is a process by which the
United States sought to break up Indian reservation land masses and to
encourage (read: coerce) individual Indians to become landowners, farmers,
and the like.294 The United States apparently wanted the same for the Creek
Nation.295 Congress and the Creek Nation reached an agreement on allotment
in 1901.296 In 1908, Congress authorized individual Creek allotment owners
287

Id. at 2462–43.
Id. at 2462 (quoting Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 470 (1984)) (internal alteration omitted).
289 Id. at 2463 (first quoting Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 411 (1994); and then quoting Nebraska v.
Parker, 136 S. Ct. 1072, 1079 (2016) (internal quotation marks omitted)) (internal citations and alteration
omitted).
290 Id. at 2459.
291 Id. at 2463.
292 See, e.g., South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 333 (1998) (holding the Yankton
Reservation disestablished); Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 420–22 (1994) (holding the Uintah
Reservation diminished); Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 585–86 (1977) (holding the
Rosebud Sioux Reservation diminished); DeCoteau v. Dist. Ct., 420 U.S. 425, 427–28 (1975) (holding
the Lake Traverse Reservation disestablished).
293 See, e.g., Parker, 136 S. Ct. at 1076 (holding the Omaha Reservation remained extant); Solem v.
Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 481 (1984) (holding the Cheyenne River Reservation remained extant); Mattz v.
Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 505–06 (1973) (holding the Yurok Tribe portion of the Hoopa Valley Reservation
remained extant); Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351, 359 (1962) (holding the Colville Reservation
remained extant).
294 See generally FLETCHER, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 28, § 3.6 (discussing various
methods used to break up Indian reservations).
295 McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2463 & n.2.
296 Id. at 2463 (citing Act of Mar. 1, 1901, ch. 676, 31 Stat. 861).
288
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to sell their allotments,297 but the Court held that this authorization was as far
as Congress got in terms of terminating the reservation—“because there
exists no equivalent law terminating what remained, the Creek Reservation
survived allotment.”298
Justice Gorsuch seeded the McGirt opinion with reminders to the state,
the United States, and his colleagues on the bench that the role of the
Supreme Court is not to make policy, or to give effect to a national policy
that was not effectuated on a specific reservation. In the section of the
opinion on the Creek allotment acts, the Court acknowledged that Congress
hoped allotment would lead to the end of reservations,299 but Congress never
reached that final stage in the case of the Creek Reservation: “Still, just as
wishes are not laws, future plans aren’t either. Congress may have passed
allotment laws to create the conditions for disestablishment. But to equate
allotment with disestablishment would confuse the first step of a march with
arrival at its destination.”300
Anticipating, as it should have, that the Court would find no
disestablishment of the Creek Reservation by Act of Congress, Oklahoma
turned to history and policy, providing what ammunition it could to the
Court’s Canary textualists.301
c. Responding to the historical and policy claims
The majority extensively addressed the arguments of the State of
Oklahoma, the United States, and the four dissenters that sought to direct the
analysis toward the policy impacts and the history of the reservation302—both
of which arguably supported a reservation disestablishment holding. But the
majority held its Muskrat textualist ground, concluding that once an Indian
reservation is established, “extratextual” authorities cannot be applied to
undo that reservation.303

297

Id. (citing Act of May 27, 1908, ch. 199, 35 Stat. 312).
Id. at 2464.
299 Id. at 2465 (“No doubt, this is why Congress at the turn of the 20th century ‘believed to a man’
that ‘the reservation system would cease’ ‘within a generation at most.’” (quoting Solem v. Bartlett,
465 U.S. 463, 468 (1984))).
300 Id.
301 The McGirt dissent’s primary arguments involved the force of history, see id. at 2485 (Roberts,
C.J., dissenting) (“A century of practice confirms that the Five Tribes’ prior domains were
extinguished.”), and the subjective political intent of Congress, see id. at 2484 (“[Congress] created a
commission tasked with extinguishing the Five Tribes’ territory and, in one report after another, explained
that it was creating a homogenous population led by a common government.”). The dissent ultimately
adhered to a different textual interpretation, finding that identification of Congress’s express intent was
not confined to “the statutory text alone.” Id. at 2487.
302 See id. at 2465–82.
303 Id. at 2469.
298
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The Court made two important points that forcefully defeated the
State’s claims. First, states cannot themselves undo the reservation status of
Indian lands. This guided the Court’s rejection of extratextual evidence of
Oklahoma’s dissident historical understanding and practice, having asserted
jurisdiction for the past century on the Creek Reservation.304 It has been the
law, at least since 1832, that state law has “no force” in Indian Country
absent congressional authorization.305
Second, McGirt stripped the judiciary of the pretense that judges can
unilaterally terminate reservations—“courts have no proper role in the
adjustment of reservation borders.” 306 Engaging in a bit of federal
government realpolitik, the Court explained that Congress, and not the
judiciary, is the only body authorized to make the decision to terminate an
Indian reservation:
Mustering the broad social consensus required to pass new legislation is a
deliberately hard business under our Constitution. Faced with this daunting task,
Congress sometimes might wish an inconvenient reservation would simply
disappear. Short of that, legislators might seek to pass laws that tiptoe to the
edge of disestablishment and hope that judges—facing no possibility of
electoral consequences themselves—will deliver the final push. But wishes
don’t make for laws, and saving the political branches the embarrassment of
disestablishing a reservation is not one of our constitutionally assigned
prerogatives. “[O]nly Congress can divest a reservation of its land and diminish
its boundaries.” So it’s no matter how many other promises to a tribe the federal
government has already broken. If Congress wishes to break the promise of a
reservation, it must say so.307

Again and again, Justice Gorsuch would not allow the Court to treat
tribal interests in such a shoddy manner.308 The McGirt majority reminded
the dissenters that the role of the Supreme Court in Indian affairs policy is
limited. The Court concluded that to allow the State to continue to exercise
jurisdiction Congress never authorized, because of historical practice, would
be to validate “the rule of the strong, not the rule of law.”309

304

Id. at 2462.
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561 (1832), abrogated by McClanahan v. Ariz. State
Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973), as recognized in White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S.
136 (1980).
306 140 S. Ct. at 2462.
307 Id. (quoting Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 470 (1984)) (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
308 See id. at 2470.
309 Id. at 2474; see also id. at 2482 (“Unlawful acts, performed long enough and with sufficient vigor,
are never enough to amend the law. To hold otherwise would be to elevate the most brazen and
longstanding injustices over the law, both rewarding wrong and failing those in the right.”).
305
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d. Oklahoma’s antics
In its effort to persuade the Court to assent to the current state of affairs
(in the companion case, Sharp v. Murphy), 310 the State of Oklahoma’s
position on whether the Creek Reservation remained extant was apocalyptic:
This case is too important and the stakes too high—for the State, the federal
government, and the 1.8 million residents of eastern Oklahoma—to be resolved
by “gotcha textualism” that casts aside the universal contemporaneous
understanding and implementation of decades of legislative action. No court,
no tribe, and no member of Congress recognized that eastern Oklahoma was
reservation land. This Court should not countenance the largest abrogation of
state sovereignty by a federal court in American history by blinding itself to
obvious congressional intent. At stake here is the history and identity of our
country’s forty-sixth state. The Court should decide—now—that Congress
created Oklahoma as one unified state.311

Oklahoma’s core argument was that “thousands” of state convictions
would be upset by the Court’s holding that the Creek Nation (and the
reservations of the other tribes that are similarly situated) was Indian
Country.312 Whether or not this assertion would come to pass, for the McGirt
majority, was not so clear. This is especially so given that many federal
convictions might also be impacted, rendering the question a matter of policy
for a policymaking branch of government to address, not the Court. 313
Similarly, when the State claimed that several federal programs would be
affected, the Court pointed out that the effects might be good or bad, but
again, that issue was not for the Court to consider.314 On the criminal justice
front, the Court acknowledged that for decades, the United States has warned
against upsetting the criminal jurisdictional regime in Oklahoma, but it also
pointed out that nothing catastrophic has happened there or elsewhere. 315
Reiterating the role of the Court, the majority concluded: “More importantly,
dire warnings are just that, and not a license for us to disregard the law.”316
Finally, the Court gave credit to the tribe, the State, and local
governments for cooperating on difficult jurisdiction matters.317 The Court
310

See supra notes 34–37 and accompanying text.
Supplemental Reply Brief for Petitioner at 1, Carpenter v. Murphy, 139 S. Ct. 626 (2018) (No.
17-1107), 2019 WL 181596, at *1; see also Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, at 2–4, Royal v. Murphy,
138 S. Ct. 2026 (2018) (No. 17-1107), 2018 WL 776368, at *2–4 (repeating many of the same
arguments).
312
McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2479.
313 See id. at 2480–82.
314 Id. at 2480.
315 Id. at 2481.
316 Id.
317 Id.
311
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left it for those governments and Congress—not the judiciary—to address
how jurisdiction would be shared.318 For many citizens of the Five Tribes,
the majority’s opening line was the most compelling statement many of them
had ever heard from the Supreme Court, and one few observers would ever
have expected to be written: “On the far end of the Trail of Tears was a
promise.”319 Muskrat Textualism won the day.
IV. WITHER OLIPHANT
McGirt v. Oklahoma is a paradigm shift in Indian affairs jurisprudence.
The Court has now denounced the Canary Textualism that would allow it to
choose what the “current state of affairs ought to be.” McGirt is not an
isolated instance of Justices counting to five (so to speak), but the
culmination of two decades of tribal strategies reaching agreement with an
emerging form of textualism on the Supreme Court.320
In the last decade, the Supreme Court has embarked on a shift to
prioritize Muskrat Textualism and properly situate the Court as the
interpreter of the law rather than the maker of the law. That program began
in earnest in Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, where the Court
deferred to Congress on the scope of tribal immunity in the gaming context,
holding it would “not rewrite Congress’s handiwork.” 321 Then again in
Nebraska v. Parker, the Court, in finding that the Omaha Indian reservation
remained extant, stated that “it is not our role to ‘rewrite’” an Act of
Congress.322
What does that mean for the Canary Textualism? This Part argues that
the reasoning of McGirt and the reasoning of Oliphant cannot exist in the
same universe. Not only has the McGirt Court stripped the Oliphant decision
of its persuasive force, the McGirt reasoning is normatively superior in every
meaningful way. The first Section applies the factors the Court considers
when addressing whether to overrule one of its decisions. The second Section
briefly describes how Muskrat Textualism would resolve contested areas of
federal Indian law and work to advance the legitimacy of the Court as an
institution. Oliphant and its progeny must give way.

318

Id. at 2481–82.
Id. at 2459.
320 For details on tribal strategies designed to appeal to conservative judges, see Delilah Friedler,
How Native Tribes Started Winning at the Supreme Court, MOTHER JONES (Aug. 5, 2020), https://
www.motherjones.com/crime-justice/2020/08/how-native-tribes-started-winning-at-the-supreme-court/
[https://perma.cc/N5RT-9VDR].
321 572 U.S. 782, 804 (2014).
322 136 S. Ct. 1072, 1082 (2016) (quoting DeCoteau v. Dist. Ct., 420 U.S. 425, 447 (1975)).
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A. Stare Decisis Factors
1. Quality of Reasoning
When the Supreme Court overrules a prior decision, it often invokes the
quality of the decision’s reasoning. 323 As my discussion of Oliphant in
Section III.A makes clear, that decision in Oliphant is poorly reasoned.
First, Congress had recently spoken on the scope of tribal powers at the
time the Court decided Oliphant in the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968324—
and the Court all but ignored Congress. The Act defined “powers of selfgovernment” to “mean[] and include[] all governmental powers possessed
by an Indian tribe, executive, legislative, and judicial, and all offices, bodies,
and tribunals by and through which they are executed, including courts of
Indian offenses.”325 Section 202 of the Act, popularly known as the “Indian
Bill of Rights,” repeatedly referred to tribal governments that exercised
powers over “any person,” again not distinguishing between Indians and
non-Indians (or members and nonmembers).326 That Act was the most recent
statement from Congress about the scope of tribal powers, a result of several
years of hearings and debate, with at least some of it about the powers of
tribes to prosecute non-Indians. 327 In 1963, the Chairman of the Navajo
Tribal Council testified that the tribal court was exercising jurisdiction over
323 E.g., Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2478–79 (2018)
(concluding that Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977), was poorly reasoned as
justification for its overruling); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 636–42 (1943)
(refuting all the key lines of analyses in Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940)). See
generally Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 864 (1992) (plurality opinion) (“[A]
decision to overrule should rest on some special reason over and above the belief that a prior case was
wrongly decided.”).
324 Pub. L. 90-284, tit. II, §§ 201–202, Apr. 11, 1968, 82 Stat. 73, 77–78 (codified as amended at
25 U.S.C. §§ 1301 et seq.).
325 Id. at § 201(2). The current version includes an amendment known as the “Duro fix,” which

includes all governmental powers possessed by an Indian tribe, executive, legislative, and judicial,
and all offices, bodies, and tribunals by and through which they are executed, including courts of
Indian offenses; and means the inherent power of Indian tribes, hereby recognized and affirmed,
to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all Indians.
25 U.S.C. § 1301(2).
326 Pub. L. 90-284, tit. II, § 202(3)–(4), (6), (8), (10), 82 Stat. at 77–78 (guaranteeing rights to “any
person”); id. § 202(1)–(2) (guaranteeing rights to “the people”).
327 Congress heard testimony in the years leading up to the passage of the Act from tribal
representatives who complained that Bureau of Indian Affairs officials had ordered the tribes to stop
arresting non-Indian offenders. Constitutional Rights of the American Indian, Part 3: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. 610, 616
(1962) (statement of Alfreda Janis, member of Oglala Sioux tribe); id. at 634, 640–41 (statement of Robert
Burnette, National Congress of American Indians). Other tribal leaders complained that the Bureauoperated tribal court dismissed cases involving non-Indians. Id. at 792 (statement of Francis Cree,
Chairman, Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians) (“Our court should have the right to prosecute
non-Indians.”).
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non-Indians.328 But when given the chance in 1968, Congress did not directly
address whether tribal powers included powers over non-Indians.
What did this mean in 1978? Perhaps it meant that Congress had
decided to allow tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians to proceed in the same
manner as before, on a reservation-by-reservation manner. After 1975, the
federal government and tribes could negotiate over that very question while
they negotiated self-determination compacts.329 The Supreme Court did not
have to foreclose additional deliberation by the legislature. But it did so
anyway.
Second, the Supreme Court should not have granted certiorari in
Oliphant. It was a case of first impression for both the Supreme Court and
all other federal courts, meaning there were no splits in authority
whatsoever.330 The obvious errors committed by the Oliphant Court in its
historical narrative likely would have been avoided had the Court allowed
the matter to percolate below. This is exactly what happened in the years that
followed the congressional fix to the Supreme Court’s decision in Duro v.
Reina.331 After Congress enacted a statutory reversal of the Duro decision,
the Court allowed the lower courts several opportunities to assess all the
conceivable arguments and waited for a true circuit split (between two courts
that had heard the issues en banc) before granting a petition for review.332 By
the time the Court granted certiorari in a case involving the Duro fix, it had
the benefit of numerous lower court decisions that focused the issues. But on
the issue of tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians, the Court immediately
jumped in. Given that the most jail time the tribe could have sentenced

328 Constitutional Rights of the American Indian, Part 4: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Constitutional Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 851, 854 (1963) (statement
of Paul Jones, Chairman, Navajo Tribal Council).
329 See generally 25 U.S.C. § 5301 et seq. (reporting on Indian self-determination, contracts, and
self-governance); FLETCHER, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 28, § 3.15 (discussing the Indian SelfDetermination and Education Assistance Act of 1975); Geoffrey D. Strommer & Stephen D. Osborne,
The History, Status, and Future of Tribal Self-Governance Under the Indian Self-Determination and
Education Assistance Act, 39 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 4 (2014) (same).
330 See Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1009 (9th Cir. 1976) (“This case involves a question of
Indian law which has been unresolved since it first arose almost a century ago: what is the jurisdiction of
an Indian tribe over non-Indians who commit crimes while on Indian tribal land within the boundaries of
the reservation?” (citing Ex parte Kenyon, 14 F. Cas. 353, 353 (C.C.W.D. Ark. 1878) (No. 7,720))), rev’d
sub nom. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
331 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
332 United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 198–99 (2004) (noting split between the Eighth and Ninth
Circuits). For additional reference, see United States v. Lara, 324 F.3d 635, 636 (8th Cir. 2003) (en banc)
(dismissing indictment on grounds of double jeopardy), rev’d, 541 U.S. 193 (2004), and United States v.
Enas, 255 F.3d 662, 664–65 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (upholding double prosecutions), and see also
United States v. Weaselhead, 165 F.3d 1209, 1209 (8th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (mem.) (same issue heard en
banc by an evenly divided court).
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Oliphant and Belgarde was six months each, the stakes were low enough not
to require immediate intervention.333 The Oliphant decision exemplifies the
problem with the Court reviewing a case of first impression.
2. Workability
A second reason for overruling a precedent is workability.334 On one
hand, in the Oliphant context, the decision has no workability problems at
all. The outcome of Oliphant is a bright-line rule barring tribal criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians. All a court has to do is determine whether a
defendant is “non-Indian” and determine whether the tribe’s charge against
the defendant is “criminal.”
On the other hand, the methodology of the Court’s analysis is not
workable. The Oliphant methodology may be invoked whenever there is no
dispositive federal treaty or statute, for example, on the scope of inherent
tribal powers. Consider a challenge to a tribe’s exercise of the power of
eminent domain. 335 The Oliphant methodology would be to gather the
historical record, try to generate a compelling narrative on whether
nineteenth-century authorities would have “assumed” that tribes possessed
those powers, and reach a bright-line rule. The Court has had several
opportunities to address the scope of inherent tribal powers since Oliphant,
but outside of one decision seven years later, the Court has not used the
methodology again.336 The Court has considered the tribal power to tax,337
tribal powers to regulate nonmembers, 338 tribal criminal jurisdiction over

333 Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 203 n.14 (1978) (“Indian Civil Rights Act of
1968 . . . limits the punishment that can be imposed by Indian tribal courts to a term of 6 months . . . .”).
The Supreme Court was not so squeamish about tribal powers over non-Indians long ago. In 1896, the
Court rejected a habeas corpus petition from a Cherokee Nation citizen who had been sentenced to death
by the tribal court. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 385 (1896). The Cherokee Nation eventually executed
Bob Talton. Hanged an Indian, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Aug. 1, 1896, at 5. Apparently, Bob Talton
was a white man, adopted by the tribe as a citizen. Cherokee Executions Postponed, TYRONE DAILY
HERALD, Aug. 21, 1893, at 1.
334 Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 792 (2009) (“[T]he fact that a decision has proved
‘unworkable’ is a traditional ground for overruling it.”).
335 See, e.g., Grand Canyon Skywalk Dev., LLC v. ‘Sa’ Nyu Wa Inc., 715 F.3d 1196, 1199 (9th Cir.
2013) (describing a tribe’s exercise of the power of eminent domain over a nonmember’s contract rights).
336 Justice Thomas praised the Oliphant methodology in 2004 but found only one other case that
followed that type of analysis: National Farmers Union Insurance Companies v. Crow Tribe. See United
States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 221–22 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (“That is why we
have analyzed extant federal law (embodied in treaties, statutes, and Executive Orders) before concluding
that particular tribal assertions of power were incompatible with the position of the tribes.” (first citing
Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845, 853–56 (1985); and then citing Oliphant,
435 U.S. at 204)).
337 Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 133 (1982).
338 Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 547 (1981).
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nonmember Indians, 339 and tribal powers to detain suspected non-Indian
criminal offenders. 340 None of those decisions delved into the historical
record with the same abandon as the Oliphant Court. In fact, one opinion
effectively recharacterized the Oliphant decision as a much simpler case of
statutory divestiture of tribal jurisdiction.341
To my knowledge, none of the lower courts have attempted anything
close to what the Oliphant Court did. Nor should they.
3. Inconsistency with Related Decisions
In the Indian law canon, the Oliphant decision sticks out like a sore
thumb. As noted above, the Court weakly distinguished centuries of settled
law by making the poorly reasoned claim that everyone “assumed” that law
was inapplicable. Within sixteen days of the Oliphant decision, the Court
issued an opinion reaffirming the same centuries of settled law.342 And by the
end of the calendar year, the Court would reach a second decision that
undermined the reasoning in Oliphant.343 A few years later, when asked by a
non-Indian party to extend the Oliphant reasoning to civil cases, the Court
refused to do so and recharacterized its reasoning to make somewhat more
sense.344 Finally, the Court has never turned to the reasoning of the Oliphant
decision as a beacon of useful analysis. Let’s take each of these claims in
turn.
a. Inconsistency with earlier precedents
The lower courts in Oliphant and Belgarde applied the settled
precedent, which was that tribal powers remained extant absent divestiture
by Congress or the tribe.345 That precedent was derived from Worcester v.
339

Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 679 (1990).
United States v. Cooley, No. 19-1414, slip op. at *1 (U.S. June 1, 2021).
341 Nat’l Farmers Union, 471 U.S. at 853–54 (“That holding adopted the reasoning of early opinions
of two United States Attorneys General, and concluded that federal legislation conferring jurisdiction on
the federal courts to try non-Indians for offenses committed in Indian Country had implicitly pre-empted
tribal jurisdiction.” (footnote omitted) (citing Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 198–99)).
342 See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323–25, 332 (1978).
343 See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 72 (1978) (suggesting that any intrusion into
tribal sovereignty must be clearly intended by Congress).
344 See Nat’l Farmers Union, 471 U.S. at 854 (“Congress’ decision to extend the criminal jurisdiction
of the federal courts to offenses committed by non-Indians against Indians within Indian Country [in the
1793 Trade and Intercourse Act] supported the holding in Oliphant . . . .”).
345 Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1009 (9th Cir. 1976) (“The proper approach to the question of
tribal criminal jurisdiction is to ask ‘first, what the original sovereign powers of the tribes were, and, then,
how far and in what respects these powers have been limited.’” (quoting Powers of Indian Tribes, 1934
55 Interior Dec. 14, 57 (1934))), rev’d sub nom. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191
(1978); Memorandum Decision at 1–2, Oliphant v. Schlie, No. 511-73C2, at 4–5 (W.D. Wash., Apr. 5,
1974) (“The nature of Indian tribal powers is marked by three fundamental principles: (1) an Indian tribe
340
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Georgia and Ex parte Crow Dog. In Worcester, the Court held that tribes
retained the powers of internal self-government.346 In Crow Dog, the Court
held that the federal government could not prosecute Indian-on-Indian
crimes arising in Indian Country without a federal statute that evidenced a
clear intent of Congress to limit or modify tribal powers. 347 Oliphant
ultimately rejected the precedents and reversed the presumption that
normally favored the retention of tribal powers.348
b. Inconsistency with later precedents
Oliphant conflicted with two precedents from the same year in tone if
not directly in substance. Sixteen days after the Court released Oliphant, the
Court issued United States v. Wheeler. Wheeler confirmed that tribal
governments retain the power to prosecute tribal members for tribal
crimes.349 Wheeler reaffirmed the general rule on retained tribal powers: “But
until Congress acts, the tribes retain their existing sovereign powers. In sum,
Indian tribes still possess those aspects of sovereignty not withdrawn by
treaty or statute, or by implication as a necessary result of their dependent
status.” 350 The Court then cited to Oliphant, which of course declined to
apply the retained powers rule.351

possessed, in the first instance, all the powers of any sovereign state; (2) Congress rendered the tribe
subject to the legislative power of the United States, and, in substance, terminated the external powers of
sovereignty of the tribe but did not by itself terminate the internal sovereignty of the tribe, i.e., its powers
of local self-government; and (3) these internal powers were, of course, subject to qualification by treaties
and by express legislation of Congress, but, save as thus expressly qualified, the powers of internal
sovereignty have remained in the Indian tribe and their duly constituted organs of government.” (citation
omitted)); Belgarde v. Morton, No. C74-683S, at 7–8 (W.D. Wash., Aug. 1, 1975) (adopting the district
court ruling in Oliphant), adopted by Order Denying Writ of Habeas Corpus, Belgarde v. Morton, No.
C74-683S (W.D. Wash., Aug. 18, 1975).
346 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 556–57 (1832), abrogated by McClanahan v. Ariz.
State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973), as recognized in White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker,
448 U.S. 136 (1980).
347 Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 572 (1883), superseded by statute, Act of March 3, 1885, ch.
341, § 9, 23 Stat. 362, 385, as recognized in Murphy v. Royal, 875 F.3d 896 (10th Cir. 2017), aff’d sub
nom. Sharp v. Murphy, 140 S. Ct. 2412 (2020) (mem.); see also Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205,
209–10 (1973) (“The Court held there that a federal court lacked jurisdiction to try an Indian for the
murder of another Indian, a chief of the Brule Sioux named Spotted Tail, in Indian Country. Although
recognizing the power of Congress to confer such jurisdiction on the federal courts, the Court reasoned
that, in the absence of explicit congressional direction, the Indian tribe retained exclusive jurisdiction to
punish the offense.” (footnote omitted)).
348 Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 206 (1978) (“[T]he commonly shared
presumption of Congress, the Executive Branch, and lower federal courts that tribal courts do not have
the power to try non-Indians carries considerable weight.”).
349 435 U.S. 313, 324 (1978).
350 Id. at 323 (emphasis added).
351 See Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 206.
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Two months later, in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, the Supreme
Court further confirmed the rule that when Congress does act to modify tribal
powers (in that case, the jurisdiction of tribal courts), it must make its intent
to do so clear.352 There, the Court considered whether to imply a federal court
cause of action to enforce the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA) beyond the
right to petition a federal court for a writ of habeas corpus. 353 The Court
refused, deferring to Congress.354
B. Correcting the Supreme Court’s Error
Imagine a non-Indian person enters a tribal casino in the Lower
Peninsula of Michigan with a loaded shotgun. Let’s assume that possession
of a gun in a casino is a misdemeanor under both state and tribal law. Casino
security and tribal police respond and disarm the suspect, but only after the
suspect resists arrest, potentially a felony under the Major Crimes Act.355 The
tribe refers the case to the United States Attorney’s Office for prosecution
under the Assimilative Crimes Act356 (or other relevant statute). The federal
government declines to prosecute. Under Oliphant, the tribe could not
prosecute. Or could it?
My view is that McGirt v. Oklahoma undermines Oliphant v.
Suquamish Indian Tribe, and therefore “a nonfrivolous argument for
extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law”
exists. 357 This Section broadly outlines how a court in good faith might
address that question.

352 436 U.S. 49, 60 (1978) (“[A] proper respect both for tribal sovereignty itself and for the plenary
authority of Congress in this area cautions that we tread lightly in the absence of clear indications of
legislative intent.”).
353 Id. at 59, 61. For reference to Congress’s (express) authorization for habeas corpus, see 25 U.S.C.
§ 1303.
354 Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 61 (“Not only are we unpersuaded that a judicially sanctioned
intrusion into tribal sovereignty is required to fulfill the purposes of the ICRA, but to the contrary, the
structure of the statutory scheme and the legislative history of Title I suggest that Congress’ failure to
provide remedies other than habeas corpus was a deliberate one.”).
Oliphant also conflicts with more recent Supreme Court decisions that defer to Congress on the proper
scope of tribal powers. Earlier in this Part, I mentioned two recent cases that explicitly stated the Court
would not “rewrite” Acts of Congress. Nebraska v. Parker, 136 S. Ct. 1072, 1082 (2016); Michigan v.
Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 804 (2014). The Court has also deferred to Congress on the use
of tribal court convictions as a basis for a federal habitual offender conviction, so long as those convictions
comply with the baseline rules established by Congress in the Indian Civil Rights Act. United States v.
Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954, 1966 (2016).
355 See 18 U.S.C. § 1153.
356 The Act allows the federal prosecutor to assimilate state criminal law for purposes of charging an
Indian Country perpetrator. 18 U.S.C. § 13.
357 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2).
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1. The Rights of Non-Indian Defendants
Assuming the same Michigan tribe brought charges against the nonIndian perpetrator, the tribe upon showing of need would offer the defendant
paid counsel.358 Four of the twelve Michigan tribes have established rules to
allow them to prosecute non-Indians for certain domestic- and intimatepartner-violence crimes,359 as authorized by the tribal jurisdictional provision
in the 2013 Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act.360 When tribal
forums implement those criminal procedure regulations, tribal judges and
any court-appointed defense are required to be licensed attorneys,361 and the
358

See, e.g., CT. R. GRAND TRAVERSE BAND OF OTTAWA & CHIPPEWA INDIANS TRIBAL CT. r. 6.005,
http://www.gtbindians.org/downloads/court_rules_32009.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZRV7-YUPX] (“[T]he
court will appoint an attorney at the Tribe’s expense if the defendant wants one and is financially unable
to retain one.”); CT. R. LITTLE TRAVERSE BAY BANDS OF ODAWA INDIANS r. 1.203(1), https://
ltbbodawa-nsn.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Chapter-1-Criminal-Procedures.pdf [https://perma.cc/
E9FB-5BVD] (“[T]he defendant shall have the . . . right[] . . . [t]o self-representation unless the Court
deems defendant unfit and appoints counsel to represent or assist the defendant. Defendant may hire, at
his or her own expense, counsel admitted to practice before the Tribal Court.”); NOTTAWASEPPI HURON
BAND OF THE POTAWATOMI CT. R. CRIM. PROC., ch. 12, § 4(C), https://www.nhbpi.org/wp-content/
uploads/2018/07/Chap-12-CR-of-Criminal-Procedure-Amended-1-5-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/UNC565QG] (“All criminal defendants are entitled to court-appointed assistance of counsel during criminal
proceedings. . . .”); POKAGON BAND OF POTAWATOMI INDIANS CT. R. APPOINTMENT COUNS., ch. 10,
http://www.pokagonband-nsn.gov/government/tribal-courts/court-rules [https://perma.cc/9QT2-Z7QP]
(“The Tribal Court must appoint counsel for a criminal defendant who is determined by the Tribal Court
to be indigent and when a potential penalty includes incarceration.”).
359 Currently Implementing Tribes, NAT’L CONG. OF AM. INDIANS, https://www.ncai.org/tribalvawa/get-started/currently-implementing-tribes [https://perma.cc/NQH9-RMSG] (listing four Michigan
tribes: Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians, Little Traverse Bay Bands of Odawa
Indians, Nottawaseppi Huron Band of Potawatomi, and Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa); What Is
Special Domestic Violence Criminal Jurisdiction (SDVCJ)?, NAT’L CONG. OF AM. INDIANS,
https://www.ncai.org/tribal-vawa/sdvcj-overview [https://perma.cc/9U8A-KK7K] (describing tribal
“jurisdiction over certain non-Indians”); Tribal Governments, MICHIGAN.GOV., https://www.michigan.
gov/som/0,4669,7-192-29701_41909---,00.html [https://perma.cc/MCC6-CY3Q] (“Michigan is home to
a total of twelve federally-acknowledged Indian tribes . . . .”).
360 25 U.S.C. § 1304. For more, see Sarah Deer, Native People and Violent Crime: Gendered
Violence and Tribal Jurisdiction, 15 DU BOIS REV. 89, 97–98 (2018).
361 Federal law requires tribal judges exercising criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians to be law
trained and licensed. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1302(c)(2)–(3), 1304(d)(2).
I am aware of several Michigan tribal judges who would meet the criteria required in 25 U.S.C.
§ 1302(c). Four of these tribal judges are profiled in Michigan’s Judiciary Success Stories. Those judges,
who are all licensed attorneys with the State Bar of Michigan, are Michael Petoskey (Match-E-Be-NashShe-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians and Pokagon Band of Potawatomi Indians), Jocelyn Fabry (Sault
Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians), Allie Greenleaf Maldonado (Little Traverse Bay Bands of Odawa
Indians), and Patrick Shannon (Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe). MICH. SUP. CT., SUCCESS STORIES IN
THE COURTS: HOW TRIBAL, STATE, AND FEDERAL COURTS ARE COLLABORATING TO BENEFIT
MICHIGAN FAMILIES 4, 8, 12, 16, http://walkingoncommonground.org/files/MI%20Tribal-State-Fed%20
Success%20Stories%2011-3_FINAL%20(1)%20(002).pdf [https://perma.cc/5KNN-SJSZ].
Other Michigan tribal judges who are lawyers include Ken Akini (Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa
and Chippewa Indians), Melissa Pope (Nottawseppi Huron Band of the Potawatomi), and Angela
Sherigan (Little River Band of Ottawa Indians).
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courts have established rules for diverse juries, 362 public availability of
laws,363 and maintenance of record.364 In short, these tribes already provide
criminal procedural protections comparable to those required by the U.S.
Constitution.
Once the non-Indian defendant is charged, they likely would seek
immediate federal court review, either under the ICRA 365 or the general
federal habeas statutes.366 While it is possible that the federal court would
order the exhaustion of tribal remedies,367 it is very possible that a federal
court would place a stay on the tribal prosecution first.368 In any event, a
federal court likely would eventually review the tribe’s jurisdiction.
Non-Indian criminal defendants under 25 U.S.C. § 1304 enjoy greater
criminal jurisdiction protections than Indian criminal defendants 369 —and
likely state and federal defendants, given that tribal judges must be licensed
to practice law.370
No doubt the defendant will argue that Congress, either by declining to
overrule Oliphant over the last several decades or by legislating piecemeal
to reaffirm limited tribal powers, has acquiesced to the Supreme Court’s
decision in Oliphant. There are several responses. One, Oliphant was wrong
the day it was decided, and “the magnitude of a legal wrong is no reason to
perpetuate it.” 371 Two, tribes complying with the special jurisdiction
established in § 1304 are already extending the rights Congress would extend
to non-Indian defendants for all crimes. Three, it is conceivable, however
unlikely, that the Supreme Court could strike down § 1304 as exceeding
Congress’s powers.372
A federal court would be justified in finding that McGirt undermines
Oliphant. The court would further be justified in finding an Indian tribe
exercising misdemeanor jurisdiction over a non-Indian criminal has
362

25 U.S.C. § 1304(d)(3).
Id. § 1302(c)(4).
364 Id. § 1302(c)(5).
365 Id. § 1303.
366 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
367 See, e.g., Valenzuela v. Silversmith, 699 F.3d 1199, 1206 (10th Cir. 2012) (collecting cases in
which federal courts have ordered the exhaustion of tribal remedies).
368 See 25 U.S.C. § 1304(e) (authorizing a stay of the tribal court proceedings under § 1304).
369 Id. § 1304(d)(2)–(4) (requiring greater protections than available to Indians under the rest of the
Act).
370 Id. § 1302(c)(3).
371 McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452, 2480 (2020).
372 See, e.g., Adam Crepelle, Concealed Carry to Reduce Sexual Violence Against American Indian
Women, 26 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y, 236, 241 n.35 (2017) (questioning Congress’s constitutional
authority to enact Indian Country legislation (citing United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 224 (2004)
(Thomas, J., concurring)).
363
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provided greater criminal procedure protections to that defendant than they
are entitled to under federal or state law. That court would be justified in
confirming the power of the tribe to prosecute the non-Indian. Not all tribes.
That tribe.
2. The Statutory Scheme of Indian Country Criminal Jurisdiction
One might argue that Congress has acquiesced to the Court’s judgment
in Oliphant by not quickly and thoroughly overruling the Court as it did in
the Duro fix, or by restoring only a small portion of tribal power over nonIndians in the tribal jurisdictional provisions of the Violence Against Women
Act (VAWA).373 The strength of the Duro-fix argument depends on whether
one is persuaded by the force of congressional silence, which the Court and
commentators agree is unclear at best.374 That argument is left for another
day.
Instead, this Article shows that the statutory scheme makes more sense
if tribes retain the inherent power to prosecute non-Indians for misdemeanor
offenses. Currently, a tribe can prosecute non-Indians for specific intimateand dating-violence crimes so long as the tribe follows the rules laid out by
Congress in the ICRA (as adopted in 1968 and amended in 1986), the Tribal
Law and Order Act of 2010 (TLOA), and the Violence Against Women
Reauthorization Act of 2013.375 Those convicted can be sentenced up to three
years jail time (or nine years if the defendant has committed multiple
offenses and the court decides to stack the offenses).376 Also, currently, a
tribe can prosecute all Indians for any crimes for up to one year by following
the ICRA.377 ICRA’s criminal procedure protections are more limited than
those under TLOA and VAWA: for example, there is no right to paid defense
for the indigent.378 The reversal of Oliphant would mean that tribes could
prosecute non-Indians for any crime under ICRA and sentence those persons
to up to a year in jail as well. The Supreme Court has already ratified the use
of tribal court convictions, even uncounseled convictions, in federal court
proceedings,379 so this would not be too far removed from sturdy precedent.

373

25 U.S.C. § 1304(b)–(c).
See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV. 67, 67 (1988).
375 See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1302(a)(7), 1304, 2802(c)(9).
376 Id. § 1302(a)(7)(C)–(D).
377 Id. § 1302(a)(7)(B), (b).
378 Compare id. § 1302(a)(6) (protecting the right of a defendant “at his own expense to have the
assistance of counsel for his defense”), with id. § 1302(c)(1) (requiring tribes exercising enhanced
sentencing authority to “provide to the defendant the right to effective assistance of counsel at least equal
to that guaranteed by the United States Constitution”).
379 United States v. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954, 1959 (2016). Bryant, of course, involved a tribe’s
conviction of an Indian, see id., a power Congress previously affirmed in 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2).
374
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3. Addressing Bias Against Indian People
Let’s now address the elephant in the room, the real reason many people
do not think any tribe should prosecute non-Indians—racial bias against
Indians and tribes. First, consider the reasons that are proffered for barring
tribes from prosecuting non-Indians. Synthesize the main arguments from
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Duro v. Reina, 380 and from the
minority views of the Senate Judiciary Committee on the Violence Against
Women Reauthorization Act of 2012.381 In short, those reasons are, in reverse
order of importance: (1) non-Indians cannot vote in tribal elections or run for
tribal office;382 (2) non-Indians cannot serve on tribal juries;383 (3) applying
tribal law to non-Indians is unfair; 384 (4) the U.S. Constitution does not
apply;385 and (5) Indians and tribes are dependent.386
Each of the first four concerns are either easily dismissed or can be
resolved by the federal court, upon a habeas petition, by reviewing whether
the tribal court exercising jurisdiction met the requirements of the ICRA. The
Duro Court could not review the 2010 TLOA that added 25 U.S.C.
§ 1302(c), nor the 2013 Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act that
added 25 U.S.C. § 1304(d), which resolves the criminal procedure and other
fairness issues, such as jury representation, law-trained judges, and the right
to counsel. The concern about political participation should not be
discounted, but a tribe can alleviate this concern by allowing for nonmember
participation on juries and in political forums open to all residents and
interested persons. The concern about the application of the Constitution has
little impact if the tribe actually provides greater procedural guarantees than
are required. And federal court review of tribal convictions is available
through the habeas process.
That leaves inferiority as the real objection to tribal jurisdiction. One
might say non-Indians’ perception that Indians and their governments are
380

495 U.S. 676 (1990).
S. REP. NO. 112-153, at 36 (2012). In contrast, the dissenters in the House argued that the bill did
not go far enough in support of tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. H.R. REP. NO. 112-480, at
245–46 (2012).
382 Duro, 495 U.S. at 688 (“Neither he nor other [non]members of [the] Tribe may vote, hold office,
or serve on a jury . . . .”). Though Duro addressed tribal jurisdiction over a nonmember Indian defendant,
the Court explained that “[f]or purposes of criminal jurisdiction, petitioner’s relations with [the] Tribe are
the same as the non-Indian’s in Oliphant.” Id.; see also id. at 693 (“We hesitate to adopt a view of tribal
sovereignty that would single out another group of citizens, nonmember Indians, for trial by political
bodies that do not include them.”).
383 See supra note 382.
384 Duro, 495 U.S. at 693 (suggesting procedural limitations exist in tribal courts); see also S. REP.
NO. 112-153, at 38 (2012) (emphasizing potential limitations of tribal courts to uphold guaranteed rights).
385 Duro, 495 U.S. at 693.
386 Id. at 686 (citing United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978)).
381
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inferior is the unspoken assumption of the judiciary and others who object to
tribal powers. The Supreme Court has stated time and again that tribes cannot
exert powers “inconsistent” with their “dependent” status.387 This rule is a
subjective, Canary textualist standard that arrogates to the judiciary the
Indian affairs policymaking function and disregards the duty of protection
owed by the federal government to Indians and tribes. Dependency is not
inferiority. Indian people are not inferior. Congress (unilaterally or in
negotiation with a tribe) is authorized to determine whether the federal–tribal
relationship strips tribes of the power to prosecute non-Indians—not the
judiciary.
If federal courts began to recognize inherent tribal powers to prosecute
non-Indians, Congress could then act based on evidence of the fairness of
those prosecutions. In the meantime, federal courts can hold tribal
governments to the law. If a tribe runs roughshod over a non-Indian
defendant’s procedural rights, and the tribal appellate court affirms, the
federal habeas right is available. This is how state and federal criminal
procedures operate. Tribes are no different.388
C. The Implications of Muskrat Textualism
Commentators on all sides agree, for various reasons, that the impact of
McGirt v. Oklahoma is potentially paradigmatic.389 This Article suggests in
more specific ways how the Muskrat Textualism embodied by McGirt could
have immediate consequences in the context of the Indian Child Welfare Act,
federal statutes of general applicability regulating private employment, and
the legitimacy of the judiciary.
1. Indian Child Welfare Act
The Supreme Court may soon address the constitutionality of the Indian
Child Welfare Act (ICWA),390 one of the most monumental federal statutes
387

United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 228 (2004) (Souter, J., dissenting); South Dakota v.
Bourland, 508 U.S. 679, 695 (1993); Duro, 495 U.S. at 686; Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands
of Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 425 (1989); Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981);
United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191,
196 (1978) (internal quotations omitted).
388 Well, tribal courts actually are different: “tribal courts often provide litigants with due process
that ‘exceed[s] the protections offered by state and federal courts.’” Norton v. Ute Indian Tribe, 862 F.3d
1236, 1250 (10th Cir. 2017) (quoting MATTHEW L.M. FLETCHER, AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBAL LAW 325
(2011)); see also FMC Corp. v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 942 F.3d 916, 944 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting
Norton for the same proposition).
389 Compare Chaudhuri, supra note 14, at 85 (arguing that McGirt serves as a turning point for the
Muscogee Creek Nation people who had grown accustomed to losing rights), with Kimberly Chen,
Toward Tribal Sovereignty: Environmental Regulation in Oklahoma After McGirt, 121 COLUM. L. REV.
F. 95, 114 (2021) (positing that McGirt provides an optimal time to rethink environmental regulations).
390 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1963.
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in the history of Indian affairs. The Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, recently
addressed a multipronged challenge to the Act brought by three states,
several adoptive families, and a biological Indian mother. 391 The primary
constitutional challenges to the ICWA, if successful, could have unsettled a
large swath of settled federal Indian law.
The district court decision exemplified Canary Textualism.392 The first
key constitutional challenge was an equal protection claim. 393 The court
acknowledged the rule articulated by the Supreme Court: a federal act
adopted in furtherance of the federal government’s trust responsibility could
not violate the Fifth Amendment’s equal protection component.394 The court
found that the ICWA applied to child welfare proceedings involving Indian
children who were not yet enrolled with a tribe so long as they were eligible
for membership.395 The court incorrectly assumed that the United States did
not have a trust relationship with those children despite Congress’s
acknowledgement of that “special relationship”396—in fact, the opinion never
references the trust relationship, and therefore deemed the ICWA as creating
a classification based on race. 397 The court then found that because some
Indian children were included who should not have been (under its
reasoning), the challenged sections were unconstitutional. 398 The district
court opinion relied heavily on solitary concurrences from Justice Thomas.399
Of course, Justice Thomas’s solitary views are his own and not the law.

391 Brackeen v. Haaland, 994 F.3d 249, 267 (5th Cir. 2021) (en banc), cert. petition filed, No. 21-380
(U.S. Sept. 3).
392 E.g., Brackeen v. Zinke, 338 F. Supp. 3d 514, 538 (N.D. Tex. 2018) (asserting without any
authority that “[n]o matter how Defendants characterize Indian tribes—whether as quasi-sovereigns or
domestic dependent nations—the Constitution does not permit Indian tribes to exercise federal legislative
or executive regulatory power over non-tribal persons on non-tribal land” (emphasis omitted)), aff’d in
part, rev’d in part sub nom. Brackeen v. Haaland, 994 F.3d 249.
393 Id. at 530–36.
394 Id. at 531 (citing Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 554–55 (1974)).
395 Id. at 533.
396 25 U.S.C. § 1901.
397 Zinke, 338 F. Supp at 533–34.
398 Id. at 536.
399 See, e.g., id. at 535 (deeming the ICWA as categorically overbroad (citing United States v. Bryant,
136 S. Ct. 1954, 1968 (2016) (Thomas, J., concurring)); id. at 538 (discussing impermissible
commandeering on behalf of the federal government (quoting Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 570 U.S.
637, 658 (2013) (Thomas, J., concurring)). Justice Thomas is well known for challenging the foundational
precedents of Indian law, recently asserting, “[T]he Court has never identified a sound constitutional basis
for any of [the foundational precedents’ principles], and I see none.” Bryant, 136 S. Ct. at 1967 (Thomas,
J., concurring).

1023

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

A panel of the Fifth Circuit unanimously rejected the primary
constitutional challenges.400 The Fifth Circuit sitting en banc issued a 209page document consisting of numerous individual opinions, with the two
primary opinions reaching 112 and sixty-nine pages.401 The sixteen judges of
the en banc court split evenly on several questions of federal Indian law,
resulting in the affirmance of the district court on several points.402 There
most certainly will be multiple requests for Supreme Court review,
reopening all of the issues addressed by the district court.
If ICWA falls, then critical statutes such as the Major Crimes Act403 and
the ICRA404 would likely be subject to equal protection challenges. These
two statutes form the core legal infrastructure for criminal jurisdiction over
Indian Country. A Muskrat textualist would acknowledge that tribal
citizenship is not a birthright. Individuals must apply for enrollment, and
tribes must accept that application. 405 Given that consideration, it was
rational for Congress to include children eligible for tribal membership but
not yet enrolled.406 The Washington Supreme Court recently acknowledged
that very reality, holding that the ICWA is triggered whenever any party in
a child welfare proceeding “indicates that the child has tribal heritage.”407
2. Federal Statutes of General Applicability
The Supreme Court likely will be asked (again) to address a circuit split
on the question of whether so-called federal statutes of general applicability
(in other words, statutes that are silent as to their application to Indian tribes)

400 Brackeen v. Bernhardt, 937 F.3d 406, 437 (5th Cir. 2019), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated
sub nom. Brackeen v. Haaland, 994 F.3d 249, 267 (5th Cir. 2021) (en banc), cert. petition filed, No. 21380 (U.S. Sept. 3). Though one judge did not join the opinion of the court, she dissented in part on other
grounds (anti-commandeering). Id. at 441–42 (Owen, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
401 See generally Brackeen, 994 F.3d 249.
402 Id. at 268 (“[T]he en banc court is equally divided on whether the placement preferences,
§ 1915(a)–(b), violate anticommandeering to the extent they direct action by state agencies and officials;
on whether the notice provision, § 1912(a), unconstitutionally commandeers state agencies; and on
whether the placement record provision, § 1951(a), unconstitutionally commandeers state courts. To that
extent, the district court’s judgment declaring those sections unconstitutional under the
anticommandeering doctrine is affirmed without precedential opinion.” (footnotes omitted)); see also
Kate Fort, Brackeen Decision Summary, TURTLE TALK (April 7, 2021), https://turtletalk.blog/2021/04/
07/brackeen-decision-summary/ [https://perma.cc/JPJ3-JBJG] (discussing the unique nature of the evenly
split bench).
403 18 U.S.C. § 1153.
404 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1303.
405 See Tribal Enrollment Process, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, https://www.doi.gov/tribes/
enrollment [https://perma.cc/Y2JF-LDCB].
406 See 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4).
407 In re Dependency of Z.J.G., 471 P.3d 853, 865 (Wash. 2020).
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regulating private employment apply to tribes.408 The default interpretative
rule requires a clear statement of intent by Congress to make a federal statute
applicable, most recently applied by the Supreme Court in 1987 in a case
federal diversity jurisdiction.409 Other than the Tenth Circuit,410 the federal
circuits still have applied these federal employment statutes to tribal
employers.411 The Canary textualist thinking behind these decisions appears
to be the belief that tribal governmental economic activities are not
analogous to those of states. 412 As the Sixth Circuit put it, “The right to
conduct commercial enterprises free of federal regulation is not an aspect of
tribal self-government.”413 This is not the judgment of Congress at all, which
acknowledged that gaming activities, for example, are used “as a means of
generating tribal governmental revenue.” 414 The lower courts’ decisions
corralling Indian tribes into the federal employment law regime rely on
numerous and competing theories designed to avoid the clear statement
rules.415 In the words of one dissenting judge (in the same Sixth Circuit case
described above), “The sheer length of the majority’s opinion, to resolve the
single jurisdictional issue before us, betrays its error. Under governing law,

408

See Alex T. Skibine, Practical Reasoning and the Application of General Federal Regulatory
Laws to Indian Nations, 21 WASH. & LEE J.C.R. & SOC. JUST. 123, 169–70 & n.263 (2016) (discussing
recent developments in the growing circuit split in federal labor law). See generally Riley Plumer,
Overriding Tribal Sovereignty by Applying the National Labor Relations Act to Indian Tribes in Soaring
Eagle Casino and Resort v. National Labor Relations Board, 35 LAW & INEQ. 131, 134–35 (2016)
(arguing that the NLRA should not extend to Indian tribes); Bryan H. Wildenthal, Federal Labor Law,
Indian Sovereignty, and the Canons of Construction, 86 OR. L. REV. 413, 454–55 (2007) (analyzing the
status of generally applicable employment laws in the tribal context); Note, Tribal Power, Worker Power:
Organizing Unions in the Context of Native Sovereignty, 134 HARV. L. REV. 1162, 1169–1172 (2021)
(describing tensions between organized labor reliance on federal employment law statutes and tribal
sovereignty).
409 Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 17–18 (1987).
410 NLRB v. Pueblo of San Juan, 276 F.3d 1186, 1200 (10th Cir. 2002).
411 See San Manuel Indian Bingo & Casino v. NLRB, 475 F.3d 1306, 1308 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (finding
the NLRB may apply the NLRA to a casino operated on a reservation); Reich v. Mashantucket Sand &
Gravel, 95 F.3d 174, 177 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that OSHA applies to a construction site owned by a
federally recognized Indian tribe and operated on a reservation); NLRB v. Little River Band of Ottawa
Indians Tribal Gov’t, 788 F.3d 537, 539–40 (6th Cir. 2015) (holding the NLRA applies to operation of
an Indian casino); Menominee Tribal Enters. v. Solis, 601 F.3d 669, 674 (7th Cir. 2010) (concluding that
OSHA applies to the commercial activities of an enterprise owned by the Menominee Indian Tribe);
Donovan v. Coeur d’Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113, 1114 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding the commercial
activities of a farm owned and operated by an Indian tribe are subject to OSHA).
412 See Oral Argument at 3:04–3:17, Little River Band of Ottawa Indians v. NLRB, 788 F.3d 537
(6th Cir. 2015) (No. 13-1464), https://www.courtlistener.com/audio/25822/little-river-band-of-ottaw-vnlrb/ [https://perma.cc/6JZH-QP65] (distinguishing tribal casino employer from other state employers,
the latter exempt from the federal labor laws in question).
413 Little River, 788 F.3d at 553 (collecting cases).
414 25 U.S.C. § 2701(1).
415 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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the question presented is really quite simple. Not content with the simple
answer, the majority strives mightily to justify a different approach.”416
A Muskrat textualist would first apply the general rule that requires a
clear statement of intent by Congress that the federal employment laws
should apply to tribes. Almost by definition, the silence of these laws as to
tribes answers that question. A Muskrat textualist might or might not like
that regime as a policy preference, but would at least acknowledge (as the
Tenth Circuit did 417 ) that tribes have adopted their own versions of
employment laws that fill the regulatory landscape of tribal employment.418
Moreover, a Muskrat textualist would acknowledge that tribal government
businesses are not merely for-profit, private enterprises, but that the revenues
generated by those businesses go directly to the provision of governmental
services.419
3. Legitimacy of the Judiciary
As a matter of principle, Muskrat Textualism is beneficial because it
enhances the legitimacy of the judiciary. The business of judging in federal
Indian law typically involves the push and pull between the powers of
Congress to legislate in Indian affairs and the obligations of the United States
to protect tribal interests from outside interference. Federal Indian law is
primarily statutory, with hundreds of treaties and thousands of federal
statutes and the regulations that interpret and implement those statutes. 420
The Court’s institutional capacity to question national policy in Indian affairs
is doubtful, especially compared to Congress.421
Indian law commentators long have argued that the Supreme Court’s
federal Indian law jurisprudence is illegitimate. 422 The Supreme Court
416
417
418

Little River, 788 F.3d at 556 (McKeague, J., dissenting).
NLRB v. Pueblo of San Juan, 276 F.3d 1186, 1199 (10th Cir. 2002).
See, e.g., Singel, supra note 23, at 498–503 (describing the landscape of tribal labor relations

laws).
419

See Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 810 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., concurring);
cf. Robert A. Williams, Jr., Small Steps on the Long Road to Self-Sufficiency for Indian Nations: The
Indian Tribal Governmental Tax Status Act of 1982, 22 HARV. J. LEGIS. 335, 385 (1985) (emphasizing
the absence of a “stable tax base”).
420 See, e.g., Robert B. Porter, The Meaning of Indigenous Nation Sovereignty, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 75,
89 (2002) (“Two volumes of the United States Code, . . . volumes of regulations, and numerous
administrative decisions and rulings, all serve as the foundation for a mountain of [Tribal] law . . . .”).
421 See generally Steele, supra note 47, at 669 (emphasizing that the judiciary is limited by both the
political question doctrine and Congress’s plenary power over Indian affairs).
422 See, e.g., N. Bruce Duthu, Implicit Divestiture of Tribal Powers: Locating Legitimate Sources of
Authority in Indian Country, 19 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 353, 379–80 (1994) (arguing that the Court relies
on sources that show “a frequently encountered ethnocentric bias toward tribal political organizations
denying the legitimacy of political systems that relied on consensus, not coercion, to regulate social
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Justices, like many other judges, know little about reservation governance or
what tribal governments actually do. For example, Justice Breyer asked at
oral argument in a recent case what scholarly work he should read to learn
about tribal courts.423 Not to denigrate Justice Breyer in any way because he
at least acknowledged his lack of knowledge by asking the question, but one
imagines that judges would not ask that or a similar question of state or local
governments. Few law students at elite law schools hear much about federal
Indian law, and tribal law—where one would learn the most about tribal
courts, for example—is offered at only a token number of schools.424 Despite
this distance from the facts on the ground, Canary textualists routinely make
value judgments about tribal governance. For example, Justice Souter’s
concurring opinion in Nevada v. Hicks expressing skepticism about tribal
courts and tribal laws is the classic case.425
Unfortunately for the Court, those value judgments often are not just
unfair to tribal interests, they are occasionally embarrassing to the Court.
Consider the majority opinion in Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family
Land and Cattle Co., which held that the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe’s court
did not have jurisdiction over a nonmember-owned bank.426 The majority
quoted Justice Souter’s assertion that tribal courts “differ from traditional
American courts in a number of significant respects” as a means to
relations”). See generally Porter, supra note 422, at 85 (“American legal theories . . . sustain illegitimate
and unconsented-to assertions of American authority over [Indigenous peoples].”); Robert A. Williams,
Jr., The Algebra of Federal Indian Law: The Hard Trail of Decolonizing and Americanizing the White
Man’s Indian Jurisprudence, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 219, 264–65 (arguing that the “plenary power paradigm”
in U.S. jurisprudence of tribal matters led to “justifying unquestioned abrogation and unilateral
determination of tribal treaty and property rights” as well as “permit[ting] the denial of other fundamental
human rights of Indian people”).
423 Transcript of Oral Argument at 41, Dollar General Corp. v. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians,
136 S. Ct. 2159 (mem.) (2016) (No. 13-1496), 2015 WL 9919326, at *41 (“I wanted to know if you
wanted me to read one thing that you have cited in respect to what is only impressionistic, that the vast
number of tribal courts are indistinguishable in terms of fairness, et cetera, from the courts of – other
courts in the United States, what would I read?”).
424 A reasonably complete list of law schools that currently offer programs on Indian law is available
at the American Indian Law Center, Inc.’s website, which lists twenty-six schools. Law School
Recruitment, AM. INDIAN L. CTR., INC., https://www.ailc-inc.org/plsi/law-school-recruitment/ [https://
perma.cc/E98L-AFV3]. Some of these schools offer tribal law or tribal courts classes regularly.
In recent years, several elite law schools have hired tenure-system faculty who teach federal Indian
law or a similar class: Berkeley (Seth Davis), Northwestern (Clifford Zimmerman), NYU (Maggie
Blackhawk, previously of Penn), Stanford (Greg Ablavsky and Elizabeth Reese), UCLA (Angela Riley),
and Yale (Gerald Torres, previously of Cornell). Harvard has a chair in Indian law filled by longtime
visitor Robert Anderson. Michigan offers Indian law classes taught by me, a longtime visitor. Chicago,
Columbia, and other top-fourteen schools rely on adjuncts or visitors. Until the last few years, when I
taught Tribal Law at Michigan (once) and Stanford (twice), my impression is that no top-fourteen law
school had offered a tribal law or tribal courts class.
425 See supra notes 124–126 and accompanying text.
426 554 U.S. 316, 320 (2008).
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undermine the legitimacy of tribal law.427 Justice Souter’s Hicks concurrence
essentialized all tribal courts and tribal law as the same, but said nothing
specifically about the Cheyenne River Sioux court system. It turned out that
the non-Indian bank opposing tribal jurisdiction in Plains Commerce had
repeatedly invoked tribal court jurisdiction to its own advantage by
“regularly fil[ing] suit in that forum.”428 More importantly, in the Court’s
effort to attack tribal laws, it forgot that the bank gained little by winning the
case. In the end, the Indian-owned company prevailed in large part—the
bank’s appeal of tribal jurisdiction was limited to only one of the several
claims raised by the Long Family Land and Cattle Co., leaving intact the rest
of the claims.429 In short, the Court decided very little. It made no new law;
the Court merely applied the Montana test to a specific fact pattern. All of
this raises the question, did the Court actually do anything at all in Plains
Commerce except forcing an outcome preference?
Muskrat Textualism imposes discipline on the Court. Instead of
deviating at will from the restraints of textualism to impose what “ought to
be,” Muskrat textualists invoke the default interpretive rules that leave
Congress and Indian tribes in a position to answer those questions first and
foremost.
CONCLUSION
In recent months, media outlets have asked me to envision what the
world would look like if treaty rights had been enforced from the outset.430 I
imagine that each time a big Indian law case reaches the Supreme Court, the
Justices think about just how much tribal power is too much. Canary
textualists seemingly worry about the consequences of their decisions on
non-Indian interests. There seems to be an enormous fear that tribal
governance will profoundly “destabilize . . . vast swathes” of America. 431
Justice Gorsuch characterized Canary Textualism perfectly: “Yes, promises
were made, but the price of keeping them has become too great, so now we
should just cast a blind eye.”432
427

Id. at 337 (quoting Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 383 (2001) (Souter, J., concurring)).
Id. at 346 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
429 FRANK POMMERSHEIM, TRIBAL JUSTICE: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS AS A TRIBAL APPELLATE JUSTICE
78 (2016).
430 See Indigenous Treaties Are Helping to Secure Environmental Wins, WNYC STUDIOS: THE
TAKEAWAY (Dec. 29, 2020), https://www.wnycstudios.org/podcasts/takeaway/segments/indigenoustreaties-are-helping-secure-environmental-wins [https://perma.cc/DJE7-ARJW]; Give the Land Back?,
FLASH FORWARD (Nov. 10, 2020), https://www.flashforwardpod.com/2020/11/10/land-back/ [https://
perma.cc/D9QJ-3XEH].
431 McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452, 2501 (2020) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
432 Id. at 2482 (majority opinion).
428
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Muskrat textualists seemingly are more circumspect. Muskrat
textualists have faith that “[Congress] has no shortage of tools at its disposal”
to correct the policy problems arising from the enforcement of the law.433
This is just basic judging. In Justice Gorsuch’s concluding words: “Unlawful
acts, performed long enough and with sufficient vigor, are never enough to
amend the law. To hold otherwise would be to elevate the most brazen and
longstanding injustices over the law, both rewarding wrong and failing those
in the right.”434
Muskrat Textualism respects Congress’s role in driving national policy
on Indian affairs. Muskrat Textualism respects the wisdom of tribal
governance of Indian Country when Congress has chosen not to legislate.
Muskrat Textualism respects settled law. Importantly, Muskrat Textualism
cuts through the background chatter that obscures the settled rules of Indian
law interpretation. Confusion would no longer be invoked as an excuse to
employ policy preferences.
Justice Gorsuch’s opinion in McGirt is a clarion call for righting the
ship in federal Indian law. Professor Frickey’s call from fifteen years ago for
more practical scholarship that might influence the Court seems to have
come to partial fruition. This Article is an attempt to offer a broader
theoretical framework for Justice Gorsuch’s call.

433
434

Id. at 2481–82.
Id. at 2482.
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